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Abstract
This Article will use recently decided intellectual property cases and other recent develop-
ments in European Community competition law to critically discuss the European Community’s
traditional and strict pro-free trade approach in intellectual property cases. It will focus in partic-
ular on issues relating to the territorial nature of intellectual property rights. Part I of this Article
examines the Court’s free trade approach in free movement cases involving patent rights. Part II
explores patent rights in the context of technology Licensing Agreements, in particular in light of
recent antitrust developments concerning vertical restraints. Part III discusses trademark issues. It
first considers free movement rules and concludes with a brief discussion of trademark Licensing
Agreements and antitrust law.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTRA-
COMMUNITY TRADE
Andreas Reindl*
INTRODUCTION
The role of intellectual property rights in the European
Community has been the subject of a passionate discussion since
the early days of the European Community. The predominant
issue has been the territorial nature of intellectual property
rights. Community law has traditionally perceived Member State
created intellectual property rights as a threat to market integra-
tion. Free movement of goods rules and competition law are
designed primarily to limit the market partitioning potential of
intellectual property rights. Other aspects of intellectual prop-
erty such as their contribution to innovation or marketing efforts
have received less attention.
The single-minded focus on the territorial nature of Mem-
ber State created intellectual property rights in free movement
of goods cases has resulted in a set of intellectual property spe-
cific rules. The European Court of Justice ("Court") developed
the concepts of "subject matter" and "essential function" to de-
cide whether the enforcement of intellectual property rights is
permissible under Community law.' Those tests are less flexible
than the rules in other cases where the Court applies exceptions
from Article 36 of the Treaty Establishing the European Com-
* Research Institute for European Affairs, University of Economics, Vienna. A ver-
sion of this Article will appear in 1997 FoRDHAM CORP. L. INsr. (Barry Hawk ed., 1997).
Copyright © Transnational Juris Publications, Inc., 1997.
1. With minor variations, the European Court ofJustice ("Court") has defined the
.subject matter" of intellectual property rights as the holder's right to put protected
products on the market for the first time. Member State laws that allow the right
holder to block parallel imports are, therefore, almost automatically found incompati-
ble with Community law. The variations in the definition of the "essential function" of
intellectual property rights are more significant among various intellectual property
rights. The "essential function" refers to the purpose or role of an intellectual property
right. Free movement rules may not undermine what the Court has defined as an intel-
lectual property right's essential function. See, e.g., Centrafarm BV and De Peijper v.
Sterling Drug Inc., Case 15/74, [1974) E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 481; SA CNL-
SUCAL NVv. HAG CF AG, Case C-10/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571
[hereinafter HAG II].
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munity ("EC Treaty") 2 with a more nuanced policy analysis that
focuses on the legitimacy of Member State policies and the pro-
portionality of import restrictions.
For the same reasons, territorial restrictions in Licensing
Agreements are subject to close scrutiny under the EC's compe-
tition rules. The recent technology transfer block exemption
demonstrates the European Commission's ("Commission") con-
tinued highly regulatory approach to territorial restraints, de-
spite the block exemption's more relaxed view of licensing re-
straints in general. The current debate about vertical restraints
has so far had little effect on similar restraints in Licensing Ar-
rangements.
Well established, sacred doctrines may create questionable
results. The predominance of the territoriality issue in intellec-
tual property cases, for example, creates the real risk that the
fundamental role of patent rights, such as the encouragement of
innovation, does not receive adequate consideration. Another
case of unduly strict enforcement of Community law is trade-
mark law where Community law continues to disregard the
trademark right holder's legitimate interest in protecting its
marketing strategy, and instead encourages parallel importers to
interfere with distribution systems.
For several reasons, it is justified to critically examine the
current intellectual property doctrines in Community law. First,
the fact that certain cases continue to arise before the Court and
the Commission is perhaps the strongest evidence that rules and
tests that automatically prohibit certain territorial restrictions
without consideration of economic circumstances have failed to
produce sustainable results. It makes little economic sense, for
example, to prohibit restraints on parallel trade in the European
Community when Member State regulations are the source of
significantly different market conditions. At the same time, the
European Community has not been able to harmonize Member
2. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 36, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573, 606 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, Feb. 7. 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247
[hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.1 (Cmd.
5179-I1) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended ly Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1
(1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
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State laws that are the principal cause of market distortions. For
similar reasons, right holders will continue to make rational de-
cisions concerning their local distribution systems that reflect
different marketing conditions and seek protection against inter-
ferences by third parties. The cases also reflect increasing incon-
sistencies between EC actions as legislator and policy-maker in
the area of intellectual property rights on the one hand, and its
application of free trade rules in intellectual property cases on
the other hand. Third, the cases provide a good opportunity to
explore the relationship between free movement of goods rules
and competition rules applicable to license restraints, in particu-
lar territorial restrictions.
This Article will use recently decided intellectual property
cases and other recent developments in EC competition law to
critically discuss the European Community's traditional and
strict pro-free trade approach in intellectual property cases. It
will focus in particular on issues relating to the territorial nature
of intellectual property rights. Part I of this Article examines the
Court's free trade approach in free movement cases involving
patent rights. Part II explores patent rights in the context of
technology Licensing Agreements, in particular in light of re-
cent antitrust developments concerning vertical restraints. Part
III discusses trademark issues. It first considers free movement
rules and concludes with a brief discussion of trademark Licens-
ing Agreements and antitrust law.
I. PATENT RIGHTS AND FREE MOVEMENT RULES
In the past, patent cases have tested the limits of the Court's
exhaustion doctrine. The 1996 Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd.
case highlighted the inconsistencies in the Court's case law in-
volving parallel imports of patented products.' The case offers
3. Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd., Joined Cases C-267/95 & 268/95, [1997] 1
C.M.L.R. 83 [hereinafter Primecrown]. Pimecrown was pending while this Article was
written and presented. In its December 5, 1996 judgment, the Court refused to follow
the Advocate General, who, in a skillful Opinion had suggested overruling Merck & Co.
v. Stephar BV, Case 187/80, [1981] E.C.R. 2063, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 463 [hereinafter
Merck/Stephar]. The Court provided virtually no reasons for its conclusions, and noth-
ing in the judgment requires reconsidering the conclusions reached in this Article.
The analysis of the Article remained unchanged, with the exception of minor textual
adjustments.
1997]
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an opportunity to critically examine the Court's traditional posi-
tion towards cases of parallel trade in patented products.
A. Free Movement Rules - Merck/Stephar and Primecrown
In Primecrown the Court was asked to reconsider the 1981
case of Merck & Co. V. Stephar BV ("Merck/Stephar") .4 It is, there-
fore, useful to begin with a summary of Merck/Stephar and the
reasons for the almost unanimous criticism of the judgment.
1. The Merck/StepharJudgment
Merck/Stephar was the Court's most extreme application of
free movement of goods rules to patent rights. It is a judgment
that demonstrates the weakness of the Court's "subject matter"
concept. Merck/Stephar extends the doctrine of Community-wide
exhaustion to products that had first been marketed in a Mem-
ber State where patent protection was not available. The Court
held that the right holder could not use patent rights in other
Member States to block intra-Community trade.5 The Court
held that the "subject matter" of patent rights guaranteed the
exclusive right to put a patented product on the market for the
first time. In the Court's view, the right holder had to take the
marketing decision in light of all circumstances, including the
existence of patent protection in certain Member States. Once
marketing has occurred, the right holder had to accept the con-
sequences of the free movement of goods rules which were of
overriding importance for both the legal and the economic cir-
cumstances.6
Many commentators have criticized Merck/Stephar and
pointed out that Merck/Stephar could not be reconciled with
principles of patent law that the Court itself pronounced in
other cases.7 In Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG ("Pharmon/Hoechst"),
4. See Merck/Stehar, [1981] E.C.R. at 2063, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 463.
5. Merck could, therefore, no longer rely on its Dutch patent rights to prevent
parallel imports into the Netherlands from Italy where it had first marketed unpatented
pharmaceutical products.
6. Id. at 2067, 9.11, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 468.
7. See, e.g., Guiliano Marenco & Karen Banks, Intellectual Property and the Community
Rules on Free Movement: Discrimination Unearthed, 15 EUR. L. REv. 224, 247 (1990); WAR-
WiCK ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS 351-52 (1993); Paul Demaret, Industrial Property, Com-
pulsory Licenses and the Free Movement of Goods Under Community Law, 18 I.I.C. 161 (1987);
Norbert Koch, Article 30 and the Exercise of Industrial Property Rights to Block Imports, in
1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 605, 61920 (Barry Hawk ed., 1987).
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in particular, the Court indirectly accepted that patent law
grants exclusive rights to market a patented product to provide
the inventor an opportunity to obtain a monopoly reward.'
Without exclusive production and marketing rights, commenta-
tors argued that the reward function of patent law does not exist.
Consent to the first marketing of a product was irrelevant if it
was not accompanied by exclusive rights.9
Another criticism of Merck/Stephar addressed the Court's
one-sided, abstract market integration concept that focused ex-
clusively on the right holder's consent and ignored economic
and patent policy considerations. Merck/Stephar's contribution
to the Community's market integration goal remained doubtful
and it actually may have encouraged greater market separa-
tion.1°
2. Primecrown
Primecrown is an important case. It not only directly chal-
lenged Merck/Stephar, but also what made the case so interesting
was that a remark by Advocate General Fennelly squarely put
before the Court the important issues of the interface of intellec-
tual property and Community law.1' What made the case in the
end so disappointing is that the Court refused to consider in any
detail the highly relevant arguments made during the proceed-
ings.
a. The Facts
The facts in Primecrown were similar to Merck/Stephar. Portu-
gal and Spain denied patent protection for pharmaceutical and
chemical products for several years after the two countries
8. Pharmon BVv. Hoechst AG, Case 19/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2281, 11 28-30, [1985] 3
C.M.L.R. 775 [hereinafter Pharmon/Hoechst].
9. The Court, however, rejected this argument and instead followed a peculiar line
of argument of Advocate General Mancini who had suggested that patents give only an
opportunity of obtaining a monopoly reward, but did not guarantee a specific return
on investment. This condition was justified, regardless of the circumstances under
which the marketing had occurred.
10. see ROTHNIE, supra note 7, at 352.
11. The outcome of Primecrown is significant also in economic terms. In 1995, sev-
eral Member States unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the Commission to extend
the exception from the free movement of goods rules for unpatented pharmaceutical
products from Spain and Portugal. Their argument was that free movement of goods
rules would result in a flood of cheap imports in their markets.
1997]
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joined the European Community. Both countries, meanwhile,
provided for patent protection and complied with obligations
under the act which admitted Spain and Portugal to the Euro-
pean Community.12 Patent protection is not retroactively avail-
able, however, for products that were marketed before pharma-
ceutical products became patentable and, therefore, fail to meet
the novelty requirement. Until patent protection becomes fully
effective, pharmaceutical products that are patented in other
Member States will therefore be marketed in Spain and Portugal
without patent protection. t s
b. The Advocate General's Opinion
A significant contribution in the Primecrown proceedings was
Advocate General Fennelly's opinion ("Opinion").14 He sug-
gested that Merck/Stephar be overruled because it could not be
reconciled with general principles of patent law. The Opinion
relied on two principal arguments. One related to patent policy
and the economic effects of Merck/Stephar, and the other re-
ferred to conceptual problems raised by Merck/Stephar.
Advocate General Fennelly first pointed out that Merck/
Stephar in effect encouraged market partitioning by right holders
who might refuse to sell a product in markets where patent pro-
tection was not available. Applying the Merck/Stephar rule to
products marketed in Spain or Portugal would lead to commer-
cially irrational decisions. By withdrawing from Member State
markets, pharmaceutical companies would avoid sales that might
still be profitable. It would, moreover, undermine the right
holder's ability to recover research expenditures and, therefore,
reduce incentives for further research if low price levels were ex-
12. Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the
Portruguese Republic and the Adjustments to the Treaties, OJ. L 3021, at 32, 86, arts.
47, 209 (1985) [hereinafter Act of Accession].
13. A transitional period during which imports into other Member States of non-
patented pharmaceutical products could be blocked has already expired or is about to
expire. Articles 47 and 209 of the Act of Accession provide that the transitional period
ended with respect to each country by the end of the third year after the country has
made chemical and pharmaceutical products patentable. The most persuasive interpre-
tation of these provisions is that the transitional period ended in Portugal on December
31, 1994 (three years after Portugal's accession to the European Patent Convention)
and on October 6, 1995 in Spain (three years after those products became patentable in
Spain). The Court confirmed these results for both countries. See Primecrown, [1997] 1
C.M.L.R. 172, 25.
14. Id.
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ported to other Member States.15
Secondly, Advocate General Fennelly criticized the logic of
the Court's reasoning in Merck/Stephar and the Court's statement
that a right holder had to take the marketing decision in light of
all circumstances, including the existence of patent protection
in Member States, and accept the consequences of the free
movement of goods rules. In the Advocate General's view, con-
sent to marketing can be relevant only where an exclusive patent
right accompanies it. Any other solution would deny the right
holder's ability to exercise its patent rights to receive a monop-
oly reward. It would, moreover, impose one Member State's
non-patent policy on the right holder throughout the Commu-
nity.1 6
The Advocate General found support for the proposition to
overrule Merck/Stephar in subsequent case law, in particular
Pharmon/Hoechst 7 He also relied on Warner Brothers Inc. v. Chris-
tiansen, the 1988 copyright case where the Court held that sales
of videocasettes in one Member State did not exhaust rental
rights in another Member State.18 Finally, the Opinion included
15. Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Primecron, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 130, 1
112.
16. Id. at 129-30, 111.
17. Pharmon/Hoechst held that marketing of a patented pharmaceutical in a Mem-
ber State under a compulsory license did not trigger Community-wide exhaustion.
Pharmon/Hoechst, [1985] E.C.R. at 2281, (1985] 3 C.M.L.R at 775. The Court reasoned
that the compulsory license prevented the right holder from exercising the patentee's
prerogative to freely consent to the marketing of a patented product. According to the
Court in Pharmon/Hoechst, patent law gave "the inventor an exclusive right of first plac-
ing the product on the market in order to allow him to obtain the reward for his crea-
tive effort." Id. at 2298, 1 26, C.M.L.R. at 798. This, the Advocate General in Primecroum
pointed out, required that patentability and the right holder's free consent to market-
ing coincide in the Member State of export before exhaustion applies. Clearly, neither
Merck/Stephar nor Piimecroum met this requirement.
18. Warner Brothers Inc. v. Christiansen, Case 158/86, [1988] E.C.R. 2605, [1990]
3 C.M.L.R. 684. In the Advocate General's view, this decision indicated that non-pro-
tection in the Member State of first marketing could not be exported into other Mem-
ber States, although this part of the Opinion is not entirely persuasive. Opinion of
Advocate General Fennelly, Primecroum, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 137-39, 133-34. It is
not at all clear that Warner Brothers marked a fundamental departure from previous case
law with regard to the relationship between Member State law and Community law,
contrary to the Advocate General's Opinion and a view occasionally expressed by other
commentators. Id.; see, e.g., RoTmNI, supra note 7, at 368-71 (stating that Warner Broth-
ers exposed the magician's hand). Wamer Brothers is a case about two different types of
exclusive rights, the distribution right and the rental right. They are separate parts of
the bundle of exclusive rights included in the exclusive copyright. In Warner Brothers,
the distribution right in the video cassettes was exhausted after the first sale in the
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an attack on the 1981 Musik-Vertrieb Membran/GEMA decision, a
copyright case where the Court held that marketing of records
in one Member State under a voluntary license that was granted
against the background of a possible statutory license triggered
exhaustion and prevented the right holder from blocking im-
ports of the record into another Member State.' 9
c. The Primecrown Judgment
In its December 1996judgment in Primecrown, the Court re-
fused to overrule Merck/Stephar.2 1 With a few conclusory state-
ments, the Court held that there was no reason to deviate from
previous case law. The Court insisted that the first marketing in
the European Community triggers exhaustion and the right
holder had to consider in advance the consequences of market-
ing products in a Member State where patent protection was not
available. 21 An exception existed only if the producer were
under a legal obligation to market the products in a Member
United Kingdom as much as anywhere else in the European Community. Warner Broth-
ers is, therefore, not a case about restrictions on parallel imports. Imports into Den-
mark were permitted, and only certain forms of exploitation were subject to the right
holder's control. Rental rights, on the other hand, are not affected by the sale of a
copyrighted object. They would not have been affected in the United Kingdom if they
had already existed at that time and they were not affected in any other Member State.
Neither did sales in Denmark affect the Danish rental rights. Warner Brothers is more
like Coditel: a performance right is not exhausted by the public showing of a copy-
righted product such as a movie. Along the same lines, a sale of a copyrighted object
does not exhaust rental rights. From this perspective, Warner Brothers arguably has little
precedential value for the issues raised in Pnimecrown. The more difficult question aris-
ing from Warner Brothers is whether obtaining a rental license in one Member State
permits the licensee to rent the copyrighted products throughout all other Member
States. The better view is that it does not, despite subsequent harmonizing legislation
in the form of the Rental Rights Directive that required all Member states to provide for
a rental right. See Council Directive No. 92/100/EEC, OJ. L 346/61 (1992). In other
words, the grant of a rental license is limited to the territory of the Member State where
the right was granted and does not extend to other Member States.
19. Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH and K-tel Int'l v. GEMA (Gesellschaft ffir
musikalische Auffohrungs - und mechanische Vervielfailtigungsrechte), Joined Cases
55/80 & 57/80, [1981] E.C.R. 147, 2 C.M.L.R. 44 [hereinafter Musik-Vertrieb]. Advo-
cate General Fennelly admitted factual differences between Musik-Vertrieb and
Primecrown. In Musik-Vertrieb, the marketing of the records in the United Kingdom was
authorized by a voluntary license between the right holder and record producer. Advo-
cate General Fennelly, however, correctly dismissed those differences as formalistic.
The availability of a statutory license limited the right holder's freedom to grant or
refuse a license and, moreover, indirectly determined the maximum royalty rate.
20. See Primecrown, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 83.
21. Merck/Stephar, [1981] E.C.R. at 2081, 7, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 481.
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State where patent protection was not available.22
Primecrown is a disappointing judgment because the Court
stubbornly refused to consider the economic aspects of market
integration in its deliberations. Instead, the Court almost
mechanically repeated traditional doctrines23 and did not at-
tempt to develop more persuasive reasons in support of its rul-
ing.
B. Free Movement Rules - Considerations Beyond Primecrown
The most important issues raised in Primecrown are related
in particular to the economic effects of parallel trade, the
Court's concept of market integration, and the significance of
government intervention for the free movement of goods rules.
These issues are not necessarily new and have been discussed in
the legal and economic literature. 24 They were rarely addressed,
however, with such directness in Court proceedings as they were
in Primecrown.
The following section considers whether greater recogni-
tion of economic effects and the state of market integration
within the European Community may justify changes in free
movement of goods rules.
1. Market Integration
Concerns about the territorial nature and market partition-
ing effects of intellectual property rights are the crucial aspect in
the Court's intellectual property rights case law. The scope of
intellectual property rights may be limited in order to allow
greater market integration.2 5 This approach assumes that limit-
22. Id. at 2080, 1 5, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 480.
23. The Court, for example, stated that market distortions caused by different
price legislation in Member States must be remedied by measures taken by Community
authorities. While this is in principle a correct statement, it does not help the right
holder in the present situation. The Court simply ignores that Community institutions
have not been able or willing to adopt such measures since the Court in the 1974 Cen-
trafarm/Sterling Drug case made this statement for the first time. See Centrafarm BV,
[1974] E.C.R. at 1164-65, 11 22-25, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 505.
24. See, e.g., ROTHNIE, supra note 7; PAUL DEMARET, PATENTS, TERRITORIAL RESTRIC-
TIONS, AND EEC LAw: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1978).
25. The Court has reasoned that accepting the patentee's right to block imports of
products that have been put on the market with the right holder's consent in another
Member State would enable the patentee to partition off national markets and, thus,
restrict intra-Community trade. See CentrafarmBV, [1974] E.C.R. at 1163, 12, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. at 504; See also Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and
1997] 827
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ing the scope of intellectual property rights, in particular a right
holder's ability to block parallel imports, will contribute to a
greater degree of market integration.26
In some cases, however, the Court relied on an entirely ab-
stract idea of an integrated market. The right holder's consent
to the first marketing in the European Community was automati-
cally sufficient to trigger exhaustion, regardless of existing differ-
ences between the market conditions in Member States. The
Court refused to recognize that regulatory intervention on the
Member State level prevented greater integration, not the right
holder's strategic use of its intellectual property rights. Limiting
intellectual property rights in these cases will not contribute to
market integration.
Cases like Primecrown question the Court's market integra-
tion concept. Advocate General Fennelly made this point when
he stated, "[t]he diverging policies of Member States regarding
the patentability of pharmaceutical products was the real cause
of the non-uniformity in the common market."27 Forcing the
right holder to accept parallel imports in these circumstances
"effectively imposes on patentees the discipline of the Common
Market where it does not in fact exist. "28
This assessment is very much in line with a 1991 Commis-
sion-sponsored study on parallel trade in pharmaceutical prod-
ucts in the Community. The Report reached the conclusion
that:
Any measures aimed at stimulating parallel trade in pharma-
ceutical products while leaving widely diverse and regulated
national price regimes intact will not create a single market in
the Community. A market economy requires market pricing,
and market pricing creates the conditions under which the
prices converge to the point where parallel trade ceases to be
profitable.29
Centrafarm, Case C 24/67, [1968] E.C.R. 55, [1968] C.M.L.R. 47; Deutsche Gram-
mophon Gesellschaft GmbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmirkte GmbH & Co. KG, Case 78/70,
[1971] E.C.R. 487, [1971] 1 C.M.L.R. 631 (discussing rights related to copyright).
26. Parallel imports will lead to greater uniformity by limiting the right holder's
market power in local markets and gradually eliminate the possibility of price discrimi-
nation.
27. Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Pimecrown, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 97-98,
1 25-28.
28. Id. at 129-30, 111.
29. REMIT CONSULTANTS, IMPEDIMENTS TO PARALLEL TRADE IN PHARMACEUTICALS
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These statements suggest that Community' law rules con-
cerning intellectual property rights cannot be a substitute for a
market integration policy. In particular, Advocate General Fen-
nelly's Opinion suggested instead that the rights of patentees
and other holders of exclusive intellectual property rights be an-
alyzed in light of the legal and economic circumstances in Mem-
ber States. Such considerations have rarely played a role in cases
involving intellectual property.30 The Advocate General's sug-
gestion to consider the real status of market integration before
deciding whether parallel imports are desirable, in terms of both
integration policy and economic effects, is a significant chal-
lenge to the prevailing attitude towards parallel imports.
2. Economic Effects of Parallel Imports
It is remarkable that in a case before the Court a member of
the Court expressly referred to economic consequences of Com-
munity free movement rules. Advocate General Fennelly re-
ferred in particular to possible welfare losses. He argued that
inadequate free movement rules might reduce production out-
put if the right holders withdraw their products from low price
markets, and also reduce research and development output by
limiting the reward that right holders are able to obtain within
the common market. 1
The arguments raise interesting questions about the eco-
nomic effects of parallel imports, especially in connection with
intellectual property rights. Economic literature suggests that
the economic effects of parallel trade and greater market inte-
gration largely depend on the differences of demand elasticities
in local markets. Exact predictions appear difficult. The prevail-
ing differences between the price levels in Member State phar-
maceutical markets, however, and the various forms of govern-
WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 84 (1991). For a similar conclusion, see Concepti6n
Fernfindez Vici~n, hy Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products Should Be Forbidden, 17
EuR. COMPETITION L. REv. 219, 224 (1996) (stating that submitting distribution and
sales of pharmaceutical products to effective competition on EC market basis is undesir-
able so long as different levels of protection of research and development and different
mechanisms of public intervention exist).
30. For notable exceptions, see, e.g., S.A. Compagnie Gin~rale pour la Diffusion de
la T6lvision, Coditel v. SA Cin6 Vog Films, Case 62/79, [1980] E.C.R. 881, [1981] 2
C.M.L.R. 362 [hereinafter Coditel 1]; Pharmon/Hoechst, [1985] E.C.R. at 2281, [1985] 3
C.M.L.R. at 775; Warner Brothers, [1988] E.C.R. at 2605, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 684.
31. Primecroum, [1997] at 1 C.M.L.R. at 128, 1 108 (Fennelly, A.G.).
1997]
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ment intervention may support the Advocate General's assump-
tions about the economic effects of a pro-parallel trade policy.
The argument in favor of unrestricted intra-Community
trade in grey market goods is based on the conventional market
integration model that assumes that, with the move towards a
more integrated market, firms will lose market power and their
price/cost margins will decline.5 2 Consumers will benefit from
increased competition and reduced prices. Overall welfare will
increase .3 Parallel imports, therefore, obviously play an impor-
tant role in the market integration process. It should lead to an
erosion of discriminatory prices and eliminate inefficiencies re-
sulting from price discrimination. The EC Treaty incorporates
this economic model of market integration.34
Rules in favor of parallel imports, however, are not always
justified. Unrestricted trade in grey market goods may lead to
lower outputs, compared to the case of separated markets and
restrictions on parallel imports.3 1 If disparities of demand elas-
ticities increase significantly, suppliers may chose relatively high
uniform prices at which low demand countries may go unserved
32. See, e.g., J. Haaland & I. Wooton, Market Integration, Competition, and Welfare, in
TRADE FLOWS AND TRADE POLICY AFTER 1992 112, 125-26 (L. Alan Winters ed., 1993)
[hereinafter Winters] (referring also to concept of "reciprocal dumping" where market
shares and prices charges in export markets are relatively lower than in domestic mar-
kets). Id.
33. See, e.g., Smith & Venables, Completing the Internal Market in the European Commu-
nity, 32 EUR. ECON. REV. 1501-25 (1988); Winters, supra note 32, at 3, 8-19; Haaland &
Wooton, supra note 32, at 125-26; see also COMMISSION, REsEARcH ON THE COST OF NON-
EUROPE: BAsic FINDINGS (1988) (discussing other factors such as scale economies and
reduction in trade barriers that resulted from different regulatory regimes in Member
States).
34. EC Treaty, art. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 573. Article 2 defines economic growth,
raised standards of living, and economic cohesion as principal Community goals. The
creation of a common market, Article 2, and an internal market, Article 3, are only
tools to achieve these goals. See, e.g., W. Bishop, Price Discrimination Under Article 86:
Political Economy in the European Court, 44 MOD. L. REv. 282, 289 (1981); see also T. Fra-
zer, Competition Policy After 1992: The Next Step, 53 MOD. L. REv. 609, 616-17 (1990)
(arguing that if increased efficiency, economic expansion, and raised standards of liv-
ing are considered as overriding goals of EC Treaty, market integration and removal of
geographical barriers should not be single focus of competition policy).
35. See, e.g., Malueg & Schwartz, Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, and Inter-
national Price Discrimination, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper, at 6-12
(1993); Bishop, supra note 34, at 287-88; see also Klepper, Pharmaceuticals: Who's Afraid of
1992?, in TRADE FLOWS AND TRADE Poucv AFTER 1992 143, 168 (L. Alan Winters ed.,
1993) (stating that decline in welfare appears more likely when price control schemes
become less effective and prices move towards more uniform prices and that losses in
consumer surpluses will most likely outweigh increased producer surpluses).
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or underserved. With fewer low elasticity countries served, out-
put is reduced and producers will reoptimize the price and raise
prices further.5 6
Economic arguments against unrestricted parallel trade are
even more persuasive in connection with intellectual property
rights. Concerns about possible negative static welfare effects of
price discrimination become less significant because the right
holder's increased profits may provide an incentive for further
innovation."' Allowing for price discrimination in order to in-
crease the innovator's reward may, moreover, be more efficient
than increasing the innovator's reward by extending the dura-
tion of intellectual property right protection."8
Advocate General Fennelly was correctly satisfied that paral-
lel imports are in principle capable of producing negative out-
put effects if market conditions are sufficiently different. He re-
jected suggestions that restrictions on parallel imports be al-
lowed only where evidence suggested, on a case by case basis,
that government intervention was likely to have adverse effects
on research and development and production output levels.3 9 It
36. Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 35, at 3, 19 (arguing that these considerations
apply in particular on regional or international level, where differences in income and
demand elasticity between markets are more significant than within one country, in-
cluding the European Community); see also Bishop, supra note 34, at 294 (positing that
permitting price discrimination probably is best rule for European Community, consid-
ering informational deficit to exactly assess output and distributive consequences of
price discrimination); Klepper, supra note 35, at 168-69 (arguing that European Com-
munity policy to achieve uniform pricing in pharmaceutical markets may lead to wel-
fare losses compared to scenario with price discrimination). Klepper's result is based
on the assumption that marginal cost pricing is not achievable because market condi-
tions are not uniform.
37. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 34, at 290; Hausman & MacKie-Mason, Price Discrim-
ination and Patent Policy, 19 RANDJ. ECON. 153, 263 (1988).
38. Hausman & MacKie-Mason, supra note 37, at 263. Price discrimination may
open up new markets for innovation because it helps to recover the high costs of discov-
ering new uses and adopting innovations for new uses. New uses will frequently require
additional research and development efforts to modify properties or to combine given
properties with other goods. In these cases, price discrimination can help to increase
output because a uniform price would not provide enough incentive to sink necessary
research and development costs. Encouraging entry into new markets will advance
market integration with greater certainty than an artificially imposed uniform price re-
quirement. See, e.g., Ergas, Economic Aspects of Competition Policy Applied to Information
Based Services, in COMPETITION LAW AND INFORMATION BASED SERVICES 133, 138 (1993).
But see J.S. Chard & CJ. Mellor, Intellectual Property Rights and Parallel Imports, 12 WORLD
ECON. 69, 78 (1988) (assuming that parallel trade has insignificant output effects).
39. Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Primecrown, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 130 1
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is arguable that in his view it was sufficient that economic models
predicted negative effects on output and on welfare.
3. Government Intervention and Price Regulation
Because of the narrow facts before him, in Primecrown, Advo-
cate General Fennelly considered primarily whether the absence
of patent protection in the Member State of export created suffi-
ciently different conditions in local markets to justify restrictions
on parallel trade. A broader application of this rationale sug-
gests, however, that the right holder's freedom to set prices
should also be a precondition for the application of free move-
ment of goods rules. In other words, if Member States of export
intervene in the market and do not allow a free formation of
prices to determine how much compensation the patent right
holder receives, negative effects of parallel imports on output
and research and development are also likely.4 0 If Member State
intervention in the form of non-patentability of products should
limit the effects of the exhaustion doctrine,4" the effects of price
regulation in Member States of export and their effects on the
free movement of goods rules should also be relevant.
4 2
The Court's position on the issue of price regulation is well
established. In Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc. ("Centrafarmi
Sterling"), price regulation in a Member State of export "cannot
justify the maintenance or introduction by another Member
State of measures which are incompatible with the rules gov-
erning the free movement of goods, in particular in the field of
40. See id. In terms of Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Treaty, if certain forms of
government intervention exist in the Member State of export, first marketing of prod-
ucts in that Member State should not trigger exhaustion, regardless of the right
holder's actual compensation.
41. Pharmon/Hoechst holds, for example, that restrictions on the right holder in
form of compulsory licenses in the Member State of export justify restrictions on paral-
lel imports. Pharrnon/Hoechst, [1985] E.C.R. at 2281, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 775. Advo-
cate General Fennelly in Primecrown suggested that the lack of patent protection in the
exporting Member State be treated along the same lines. Opinion of Advocate General
Fennelly, Primecronm, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 130-31, 1 113. Advocate General Fennelly
also argued that first marketing does not trigger exhaustion if the possibility of a statu-
tory license eliminates the right holder's freedom to decide whether to grant a license
and to determine the terms of the license. Id. at 131, 114.
In all these cases, regulatory intervention in the Member State of export makes the
exhaustion doctrine inapplicable.
42. See also Santiago Martinez Lage, State Price Control and EC Competition Law, in
1995 FORDHAM CORP. L. INsr. 161 (Barry Hawk ed., 1996).
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industrial and commercial property."4'
Interestingly, neither the Advocate General, the intervening
Member States, nor the Commission suggested that the Court
should reconsider its position. This may be not surprising in the
case of Member States. They are apparently primarily con-
cerned about the freedom to maintain their current price con-
trol regimes without interference by Community law." It is sur-
prising, though, that Advocate General Fennelly uncritically
adopted the same view and merely repeated the Court's price
control statement in Centrafarm/Sterling Drug. His position on
price control is not consistent with his arguments about the lack
of patent protection in Spain and Portugal. Non-protection and
government price controls in the Member States of first market-
ing may have similar economic effects.
It is difficult to see the difference between a system of indi-
rect price control through denial of patent protection45 and
other forms of direct price control. Advocate General Fennelly
criticized that Merck/Stephar may lead to the withdrawal of the
products in the Member States with no patent protection and
reduce overall output in the common market.46 The same ef-
fects are likely if Member States suppress the prices that right
holders can charge for their patented products. The losses from
parallel imports into high price countries in both cases might
encourage the right holder to withdraw the product from mar-
kets in low price countries.
Second, as Advocate General Fennelly suggested, free move-
ment of goods rules may not result in the export of one Member
State's restrictive legal regime into other Member States. This
43. Centrafarm BV, [1974] E.C.R. at 1147, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 481; see also
Primecrmtm, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 175-76, 1 47. This statement is a conclusion and not
an explanation for the rule. Moreover, it suffers from a certain circularity. The Court
stated that Member State measures that restrict parallel imports cannot be maintained
if they are incompatible with the rules concerning the free movement of goods. It was,
of course, exactly the question before the Court under which conditions restrictions on
imports rules infringe EC law.
44. Id. In their submissions in Primecroum, the Member States and Commission
apparently emphasized that national price regulations were permissible as part of Mem-
ber State health and social security policies. See Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly,
Primecromwn, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 150, 163.
45. If a Member State altogether denies patent protection to eliminate the inven-
tor's potential market power and to encourage copyists to market competing products,
it uses this system to limit the price that the inventor can charge.
46. Id.
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would infringe the interests of the right holders and impose on
them a Community-wide regime where such a common market
does not exist. Query whether a logical distinction exists be-
tween exports of a non-patent policy and exports of price con-
trols.
In light of the Primecrown facts and the Advocate General's
analysis, it is arguable that a link exists between free movement
of goods and the existence of a market-based patent law system
that enables a right holder to charge for the protected product
what the market allows. 47 If such a system is absent in the Mem-
ber State of export, the principle of Community-wide exhaustion
may result in negative economic effects and should not be ap-
plied uncritically. For example, one could argue that marketing
in a Member State where the government directly fixes prices
does not trigger exhaustion.4' At least one Advocate General
considered that this might be the appropriate rule.49
4. Forcing Member States to Act
Judgments that restrict the freedom of parallel imports
might benefit market integration in the long run, in particular
with regard to pharmaceutical markets. Currently, virtually all
Member States appear to favor parallel imports. This is not sur-
prising in the case of high price, importing countries. It appears
somehow counterintuitive in the case of low price, exporting
Member States. Their pro-parallel trade attitude may perhaps
be best explained by the fact that certain industry sectors benefit
from export opportunities."°
In the current situation, a Member States' best strategy is to
47. See Demaret, supra note 7, at 175.
48. This does not mean that the European Community should condemn all forms
of government intervention in health care markets or pharmaceutical markets. It only
means that free movement of goods rules should not be permitted to export one Mem-
ber State's regulation into another Member State.
49. Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others v. Paranova, Joined Cases C-427/93, 429/93 &
436/93, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 1151; Eurim-Pharm v. Beiersdorf and Others, Joined Cases
C-71/94, 72/94 & 73/94, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 1222; MPA Pharma v. Rh6ne-Poulenc, Case
C-232/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-3671.
50. One might expect that low price Member States would favor restrictions on
parallel imports into other countries. Allowing unrestricted parallel trade originating
in their territories arguably has negative welfare effects for their consumers. Prices in
the country of export will increase, at least in the long run, if parallel trade eliminates
price differentials between markets. A liberal parallel import regime might, moreover,
reduce output in the low price country.
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maintain the current rules and ensure the benefits of parallel
imports. The negative effects of the current situation are exter-
nal and largely fall on the right holders. The right holders' re-
turn on investment is reduced when parallel trade exports artifi-
cially low prices into other Member States.5 '
Perhaps, then, a Court judgment that allows for greater re-
striction of parallel imports would encourage Member States to
harmonize their national health care regimes to the point where
unrestricted, parallel imports will again be permissible. Parallel
imports would presumably still occur after partial harmonization
because price levels, demand elasticities, and income levels are
different.52 Only after partial harmonization that removes, for
example, direct price controls, however, could parallel imports
effectively fulfill their function of gradually eliminating unjusti-
fied price differences between geographic markets.
5. Industrial Policy and Patent Legislation
Recent EC moves towards stronger intellectual property
protection, in particular in connection with patent protection in
the pharmaceutical industry,53 are apparently based on the as-
sumption that broader intellectual property rights increase the
right holder's revenues and indirectly encourage increased re-
search and development activities. In a 1994 document, the
Commission specifically referred to improved intellectual prop-
erty protection as a tool to strengthen the EC pharmaceutical
industry. At the same time, the Commission warned Member
States against weakening the pharmaceutical industry in the in-
terest of national health and social security policies.54
The commitment to stronger intellectual property rights is
51. See also REMIT CONSULTANTs, supra note 29, at 79-81 (concerning allocation of
profits from parallel imports, all parties in distribution channel benefit at expense of
manufacturer.)
52. See, e.g., Merck's AIDS Drug Marketing Policy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1996, at 1
(reporting that price differences likely to remain, even though pharmaceutical manu-
facturer implemented new price policy charging same wholesale price throughout Eu-
rope for certain drugs).
53. See, e.g., Council Regulation No. 1768/92, Concerning the Creation of a Sup-
plementary Protection Certificate for Medicinal Products, o.J. L 182/1 (1992). Similar
developments occurred in the area of copyright, specifically the 1993 Copyright Term
Directive and the 1996 Database Directive. See Council Directive No. 93/98/EC, O.J. L
209/13 (1993) (Copyright Term Directive); Council Directive No. 96/9/EC, 0.J. L 77/
20 (1996).
54. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Par-
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based exactly on the market-based patent law model55 and, ar-
guably, also by the Advocate General's Opinion in Primecrown.
This raises questions about free movement rules that encourage
trade in grey market products.5 6 The current approach to en-
courage parallel trade and at the same time increase the term
and scope of intellectual property rights may not represent the
most efficient balance between static welfare losses and dynamic
welfare gains. Providing additional incentives to inventors by ex-
panding the scope and duration of intellectual property rights
might impose higher costs on society than allowing some form
of price discrimination, without increasing the amount of reve-
nue that right holders receive. 7 Expanding the scope and dura-
tion of rights might moreover restrict access to existing technol-
ogy for competing innovators. Promoting more rapid dissemina-
tion of technology appears more desirable than supporting
parallel traders, considering that trade in grey market products
contributes nothing to technological development.58
C. Conclusions on Patent Rights and Free Movement Rules
Cases like Primecrown demonstrate the weakness of the
Court's "subject matter" test. The Court defined the subject
matter of patent rights as the patentee's exclusive right to manu-
facture a product and put the patented product on the market
within the European Community for the first time.59 If applied
with a single-minded focus on the right holder's consent to the
first marketing, the "subject matter" test ignores the circum-
stances under which marketing in the common market occurs.
Consent to marketing, however, must be considered in light of
the economic conditions under which the products were put on
the market. Otherwise, the mechanical application of pro-paral-
liament on the Outlines of an Industrial Policy for the Pharmaceutical Sector in the
European Community, COM (93) 718 final.
55. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding legal and
economic circumstances as considerations in intellectual property disputes).
56. See also Fernindez Vici~n, supra note 29, at 51.
57. See Hausman & MacKie-Mason, supra note 37, at 263.
58. See Frazer, supra note 34, at 621 (arguing that focus on development of new
technology model provides possible foundation of post-1992 EC competition policy).
Frazer also noted that restrictions which affect Community markets would be accepted
where they lead to an increase in innovation. Id.
59. Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, Primecrown, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 127-
28, 107.
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lel trade rules may have undesirable economic consequences.
Parallel imports raise concerns not only if a Member State fails
to provide patent protection, but also where a Member State in-
tervenes in the market in the form of price controls.
This suggests that rather than mechanically using the "sub-
ject matter" test to find Community-wide exhaustion, the Court
should perhaps use a proportionality test like in other Article 36
cases to decide whether first marketing exhausts intellectual
property rights throughout the European Community. This
would allow the Court to take a broader range of patent policy
concerns into account, in particular where economic circum-
stances in Member State markets are significantly different.
II. TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AGREEMIENTS
The territorial nature of intellectual property rights has an
equally dominant influence on the evaluation of intellectual
property Licensing Agreements. It resulted in a broad applica-
tion of Article 85(1) to territorial license restraints. Two recent
developments suggest, however, that traditional views concern-
ing the application of Article 85(1) to territorial restraints may
gradually change. First, the 1996 Technology Transfer Agree-
ment Block Exemption6" ("Technology Transfer Block Exemp-
tion") indicates that the Commission might analyze direct sales
restrictions in Licensing Agreements with greater flexibility. Sec-
ond, the European Community's current vertical restraints de-
bate should also affect the analysis of license restrictions.
A. Technology Transfer Block Exemption - Direct Sales Prohibitions
The very detailed regulation of territorial restraints in the
Technology Transfer Block Exemption provides evidence that
certainly in the Commission's view, territorial restraints are the
key issue in Licensing Agreements. With respect to direct sales
prohibitions, however, the Technology Transfer Block Exemp-
tion expresses at the same time uncertainty about the scope of
Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty, the applicability of Articles 30
and 36 of the EC Treaty, and the relationship among these pro-
60. Commission Regulation No. 240/96 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, O.J. L 31/2 (1996)
[hereinafter Technology Transfer Block Exemption).
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visions.61
Article 1 of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption ap-
pears to assume that territorial restrictions generally fall under
Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty and need an exemption to be
enforceable. 62 At the same time, Article 2(14) of the Technol-
ogy Transfer Block Exemption confirms that a patentee may rely
on its patent rights to prevent direct sales of a licensee outside
the licensed territory.65 This creates the odd result that a right
holder can rely on its patent rights against direct sales without
infringing free movement of goods rules and competition rules,
but can enforce the licensee's contractual obligations only so
long as the prohibition from direct sales is exempted under the
Technology Transfer Block Exemption. The licensor would
therefore be better off by omitting any reference to direct sales
from the license agreement and enforcing patent rights if direct
sales occur.
This situation raises the question of how the free movement
of goods rules under Articles 30 and 36 affect the application of
Article 85(1) to territorial restrictions in Licensing Agreements.
In Recital 11 of the Preamble to the Technology Transfer Block
Exemption, the Commission apparently assumes that the two
61. See id. pmbl., recital 11, OJ. L 31/2, at 3 (1996).
62. The Commission may analyze exclusive licenses differently. Recital 10 explains
that the grant of exclusive rights may fall outside Article 85(1) under certain circum-
stances. Id. pmbl., recital 10, O.J. L 31/2, at 3 (1996). Whether the Commission is
really committed to a full economic analysis as required under Maize Seed, however,
appears doubtful. See L.C. Nungesser KG and Eisele v. Commission, Case 258/78,
[1982] E.C.R. 2015, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 278 [hereinafter Maize Seed]. The Commission
apparently assumes, for example, that any extension of exclusivity beyond the terms
permitted in Article 1 requires an individual exemption under Article 85(3) and states
that such exemption might be granted, in particular, if it is necessary to protect expen-
sive and risky investment. See Technology Transfer Block Exemption, supra note 60,
pmbl., recital 14, O.J. L 31/2, at 5 (1996). The Maize Seed principles appear applicable
in exactly those circumstances. Where the type of investment justifies the grant of ex-
clusive rights, Article 85(1) should be inapplicable and, therefore, make an exemption
under Article 85(3) unnecessary. It remains to be seen whether, under the new Tech-
nology Transfer Block Exemption, the Commission will follow the Court in Maize Seed
and find an infringement only after a full economic analysis to a greater extent than
under the two previous block exemptions
63. The language of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption appears to apply
only to a patentee, not to an exclusive licensee who grants a territorially limited subli-
cense. Arguably, however, the holder of an exclusive license should have the same
rights as the patentee.
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sets of rules are related to a certain extent.64 The issue will be-
come particularly important should the Court eventually con-
firm that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to direct
sales.65
One solution to this problem is to completely separate the
analysis of direct sales under free movement of goods rules and
competition law. In other words, that enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights may be permissible under Articles 30 and 36
of the EC Treaty does not prejudice the antitrust analysis of terri-
torial restraints. Whether prohibitions from direct sales infringe
Article 85 (1) would then depend only on an antitrust analysis of
the license agreement and its anticompetitive effects. In other
words, even if Articles 30 and 36 do not prohibit the enforce-
ment of patent rights, direct sales restrictions may still be found
invalid under competition rules.
Another approach would be to use an analysis similar to
that used in Ideal-Standard. In Ideal-Standard, the Court held that
an agreement to assign trademark rights which was compatible
with Articles 30 and 36 did not automatically infringe Article
85(1). Article 85(1) applied only if additional evidence existed
for an anticompetitive purpose of the agreement. 66 In the con-
text of patent Licensing Agreements, and assuming that block-
ing direct sales is compatible with Articles 30 and 36, this sug-
64. Technology Transfer Block Exemption, supra note 60, pmbl., recital 11, O.J. L
31/2, at 4 (1996). Recital 11 provides:
The exemption of export bans on the licensor and on the licensees does not
prejudice any developments in the case law of the Court ofJustice in relation
to such agreements, notably with respect to Articles 30 to 36 and Article 85 (1).
This is also the case, in particular, regarding the prohibition on the licensee
from selling the licensed product in territories granted to other licensees (pas-
sive competition).
Id.
65. The Court has never directly decided whether the free movement of goods
rules prohibit the enforcement of patent rights against sales by a licensee outside the
licensed territory. The Court's language in free movement and intellectual property
cases suggests, however, that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to direct sales.
The Court stated that exhaustion applies after products have been put on the market in
the Member State of export. The Commission traditionally took the opposite view. See
James Venit, In the Wake of Windsurfing: Patent Licensing in the Common Market, in 1986
Fo.Dtms CoRe. L. INsT. 517, 523-26 (Barry Hawk ed., 1987). The reversal of HAGIand
the end of the common origin doctrine removed a major argument in favor of the
Commission's position.
66. IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH, Case C-9/93,
[1994] E.C.R. 1-2789, [1994) 3 C.M.L.R. 857.
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gests that direct sales prohibitions are compatible, in principle,
with Article 85 (1), unless additional factors demonstrate that the
agreement restricts competition.6 7
The second approach is, of course, similar to the first one.
In both cases, Article 85 (1) should be applied only after an anal-
ysis of the facts of the case. The Ideal-Standard approach is never-
theless preferable in the context of EC competition law, consid-
ering the Commission's tendency to automatically find that ex-
port restrictions infringe Article 85(1) of the EC Treatyonly to
then exempt the restrictions for a limited time under Article
85(3) of the EC Treaty. An analysis similar to the analysis in
Ideal-Standard would require a full analysis of all circumstances
under Article 85 (1) before finding that prohibitions from direct
sales infringe competition law. A more or less mechanical appli-
cation of Article 85(1) to direct sales prohibitions would no
longer be permissible.68
B. Territorial Restraints in Patent Licensing Agreements
The application of Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty to re-
straints in Licensing Agreements is an important issue not only
within the context of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption.
It is even more significant with respect to Licensing Agreements
that do not benefit from the Technology Transfer Block Exemp-
tion. A development that might influence the analysis of license
restraints in general is the current debate about the application
of Article 85(1) to vertical restraints in general.
67. A violation of Article 85(1) may exist, for example, if export prohibitions are
used to divide markets between two licensees with considerable market power that are
at least potential competitors. A third approach would grant immunity from Article
85(1) for territorial restrictions if the enforcement of intellectual property rights are
compatible with Articles 30 and 36. A combined analysis of Coditel I and Coditel II rules
out that approach. The two cases demonstrate that restrictions that are compatible
with free movement rules may nevertheless infringe Article 85(1).
68. An approach similar to that used in Ideal-Standard would confirm that an analy-
sis like that used in Maize Seed applies to direct sales prohibitions. See Maize Seed, [1982]
E.C.R. at 2015, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 278. The Court in Maize Seed was ambiguous on
this issue. Id. at 2068-2074, 52, 55, 77 [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 352-356. The logic of
Maize Seed strongly suggests, however, that limited territorial protection in the form of
export restrictions may fall outside Article 85(1). With respect to the grant of exclusiv-
ity, the Court required consideration of economic circumstances, such as the protec-
tion of the licensee's investment and strengthening of inter-brand competition, before
finding an infringement of Article 85(1). The same considerations that in the Court's
view justified exclusive licenses may apply to prohibitions from direct sales.
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1. Vertical Restraints and License Restraints
Even though Licensing Agreements and vertical arrange-
ments outside the licensing context raise, in part, different anti-
trust concerns, the two areas have certain issues in common. In
particular, the criticism that EC competition law views a restric-
tion on the freedom of action of the parties as a restriction of
competition and puts too much emphasis on certain clauses
rather than analyzing the market structure and the impact of an
agreement on the market equally applies to Licensing Agree-
ments. In both cases, the debate focuses on the question of
whether a full economic analysis should be part of the Article
85(1) analysis or be reserved for the application of Article
85(3)of the EC Treaty.69
The courts have moved towards greater recognition of eco-
nomic principles and put more emphasis on market structures
in evaluating vertical restraints under Article 85(1).7o Several
commentators approved this development. 71 The Court of Jus-
tice, in a much earlier case, required an analysis of economic
circumstances to assess restrictions in Licensing Agreements. 72
The Commission's practice, however, has not followed the
Court's approach in either area.73
69. See, e.g., David Deacon, Vertical Restraints Under EU Competition Law: New Direc-
tions, in 1995 FORHAM CORP. L. INST. 307, 309-10 (Barry Hawk ed., 1996) (providing
general discussion of vertical restraints). The licensee's freedom to act used to be an
important concern of EC competition law. The Technology Transfer Block Exemption
indicates that the restriction on the freedom of action rationale may be of lesser impor-
tance in the future.
70. Delimitis v. Henninger Brhu AG, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935, 5
C.M.L.R 210; see also Langnese-Iglo GmbH v. Commission, Case T-7/93, [1995] E.C.R.
11-1533 (Ct. First Instance); Schtller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co. KG v. Commission,
Case T-9/93, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1611. Collectively these cases are called the Ice Cream
cases. The Court has not been entirely consistent in recent judgments. See
Bundeskartellarnt v. Volkswagen AG, Case C-266/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3477, 1-3517 1 23,
[1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 478, 505 (holding that restriction of individual freedom of distribu-
tors infringe Article 85(1)).
71. Barry Hawk, System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law, 32 COM-
MON MARKET L. Raw. 961, 973 (1995); Deacon, supra note 69; Christopher Bright, Dereg-
ulation of EC Competition Policy: Rethinking Article 85(1), in 1994 FoRDHtAm CORP. L. INST.
505 (Barry Hawk ed., 1995).
72. See Maize Seed, [1982] E.C.R. at 2078, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 352-56; Coditel SAy.
Cine-vog Films SA [1982] E.C.R. 3381, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. 49 [hereinafter Coditel
H/] (finding territorial restraints); Bayer AG and Maschinenfabrik Hennecke GmbH v.
Sfillh6fer, Case C 65/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5249, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 182.
73. See, e.g., Sch6ller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co. KG, O.J. L 183/1 (1993);James D.
Veltrop, Tying and Exclusive Purchasing Arrangements Under EC Competition Law, 31 CoM-
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Licensing restrictions and restrictions in other vertical ar-
rangements do not always raise identical antitrust concerns. For
example, horizontal elements in the licensor-licensee relation-
ship may be more common in a licensing agreement than in dis-
tribution arrangements. Licensing restrictions may have effects
not only on the product market, but also on the upstream mar-
ket for the licensed and competing technologies. Such risks may
be less important outside the licensing context. The risk and
uncertainty faced by both sides, on the other hand, may be more
significant in a Licensing Agreement. This factor and the ease
of misappropriation mayjustify otherwise anticompetitive restric-
tions.
The differences, however, do not justify considering licens-
ing restraints as particularly suspect when compared to restraints
in other vertical agreements. Intellectual property rights do not
automatically create market power and are not inherently an-
ticompetitive. 4 Intellectual property rights, therefore, should
not be subject per se to an antitrust analysis that is fundamentally
different from the analysis of other vertical arrangements. Intel-
lectual property-specific concerns can be taken into account in
evaluating the specific market circumstances.75
2. Market Structure
As in the case of vertical arrangements in general, restric-
tions on the freedom to act are not automatically a restriction of
MON MARKET L. REv. 549 (1994) (criticizing Commission's reluctance to follow the prin-
ciples pronounced by the Court in Delimitis).
74. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't ofJustice & Federal Trade Comm'n, 1995 Intellectual Prop-
erty Antitrust Guidelines, 2.1 (Apr. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Intellectual Property
Guidelines]. Attempts to develop intellectual property right-specific antitrust rules
failed to provide workable standards.
75. Certain justifications for territorial restraints in vertical agreements outside the
licensing context may be less persuasive if applied to Licensing Agreements. An impor-
tant argument in favor of territorial restraints in distribution arrangements is the close
relationship between distributor and manufacturer where both influence the manufac-
turer's production and marketing decisions. In this case, where the distributor's feed-
back is critical, interference with the cooperative relationship between distributor and
manufacturer through unauthorized imports appears undesirable. See e.g., Deacon,
supra note 69, at 319. A similar argument applies to license arrangements only where
the licensee's marketing efforts are a dominant element in a licensing arrangement. It
is less persuasive if the licensee's independent research and development efforts to fur-
ther develop the licensed technology are the principal aspect of a license arrangement
because cooperation between the licensee and the licensor appears less important.
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competition.76 If the licensor and licensee are in a vertical rela-
tionship at the time they enter into a license agreement, restric-
tions in Licensing Agreements do not restrict competition so
long as the restrictions affect only the parties' freedom to act. In
this case, effects on third parties are the major concern, includ-
ing the license agreement's effects on the dissemination of com-
peting technology and the development of new technology.
Restrictions that affect the position of third parties may oc-
cur in the markets for technology and intellectual property
rights as well as the markets for products. Exclusivity provisions
in favor of the licensee may, for example, restrict competition if
the licensee's competitors are denied access to important inputs
such as the licensed technology.77 The licensor's competitors
might be denied market access with regard to their technology if
exclusivity clauses prevent a significant number of potential
licensees from using competing technology.
78
Licensing Agreements, at least between parties in a vertical
relationship, and other vertical arrangements, therefore, have in
common that anticompetitive effects largely depend on the mar-
ket structure and the position of the parties concerned. If the
licensee and licensor have no market power in either market,
76. See generally Deacon, supra note 69; Hawk, supra note 71. In one respect, re-
strictions on the parties' freedom to act may be of greater relevance in Licensing Agree-
ments. Restrictions in licensing Agreements may affect the licensee's independent Re-
search and development efforts, at least where the licensee controls the necessary re-
sources for such activities. One example of restrictions that affect the upstream market
for technologies are exclusive grant back provisions that give an incumbent control
over significant areas of newly developed technology. Non-competition provisions that
make it impossible for licensees to switch to competing technology might be another
case where the licensor controls significant parts of the market so that there are fewer
outlets for competing technology. These concerns about effects on upstream markets
provide yet another argument to treat territorial restraints more leniently and focus
only on the effects on third parties. Territorial restrictions are unlikely to reduce the
incentive to innovate.
77. Intellectual property rights always have exclusionary effects. The licensee's
competitors may never have access to the relevant technology because of the patentee's
exclusive rights. The main concern is, therefore, that the licensee increases market
power by acquiring control over competing technologies, and, thus, prevents competi-
tion between technologies.
78. Foreclosure of market access for competing technology might be more rele-
vant than similar foreclosure effects in non-intellectual property related vertical ar-
rangements. At least in some markets, the number of potential competent licensees
will be small. See, e.g., FJ. CoTr.ACrOR, INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING: COM-
PENSATION, COSTS AND NEGOTIATION 112 (1981); R. Caves et al., The Imperfect Market for
Technology Licenses, 45 OxF. BULL. ECON. & STAT. 249, 250 (1983).
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restrictions in Licensing Agreements are unlikely to raise an-
ticompetitive concerns. Attempts to restrict access to technology
or to raise prices in the product market would fail as long as
markets are not concentrated and competing technologies or
products are available. Competition from other technologies or
products reduces the risk that restrictions on intra-brand compe-
tition will have negative effects. 79 This applies to territorial re-
straints as well as non-territorial restraints.
Interestingly, the Technology Transfer Block Exemption
does incorporate a reference to market structure as a factor to
assess the lawfulness of territorial restrictions. Article 7 empow-
ers the Commission to withdraw the block exemption where a
license agreement is incompatible with Article 85(3) of the EC
Treaty. Article 7(1), in particular, refers to a licensee's market
share as a relevant factor and indicates that insufficient competi-
tion might exist if the licensee's market share exceeds forty per-
cent of the relevant market.8 °
Article 7(1) of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption
indicates that the Commission is prepared to apply a broader
analysis of market circumstances to determine possible anticom-
petitive effects of Licensing Agreements. The same reference to
market structure should apply to determine that anticompetitive
effects are unlikely in circumstances where the parties clearly do
not possess market power. This would allow the conclusion that
territorial restrictions between parties without significant market
shares create no danger of restricting competition.
79. See, e.g., OECD, COMPETITION POLICY AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS: FRANCHISING
AGREEMENTS (1994) [hereinafter FRANCHISING AGREEMENTS]; Deacon, supra note 69, at
316; see also Sch6ller, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1611 (stating that assessment of competitive effects
of exclusive purchase obligation requires analysis of market conditions). Although the
Ice Cream cases dealt only with exclusive purchase obligations, the Court of First In-
stance's reasoning appears to apply in general to vertical restrictions. See Deacon, supra
note 69, at 313.
80. This is the light version of the much criticized provision in the Commission's
original proposal which would have made the Technology Transfer Block Exemption
automatically inapplicable if the licensee held a market share above 40%. Preliminary
Draft Commission Regulation (EC) of 30 Sept. 1994 on the Application of Article 85(3)
of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, art. 1(8) (6)
(1994) OJ. C 178/3, at 8-9, as corrected by O.J. C 187/16 (1994). Earlier drafts circulated
to Member States were even more restrictive and provided for the block exemption's
inapplicability at even lower market shares. See Valentine Korah, The Preliminary Draft of
a New EC Group Exemption for Technology Licensing, 16 EUROPEAN IrELL. PROP. REv. 263,
265 (1994) (criticizing the proposed market share cap).
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The situation changes, however, when the relationship
ceases to be purely vertical and horizontal elements exist in the
relationship, or in other words, if the licensor and licensee are at
least potential competitors at the time they enter into the license
agreement. This is the case, for example, when the licensor is
active in both the upstream and the downstream markets and
grants a license for the manufacture of competing products., t
Horizontal effects may also exist with respect to possible coordi-
nation among either the licensor or the licensee and their re-
spective competitors.82 Restrictions in Licensing Agreements
with horizontal elements might still be beneficial, but additional
scrutiny is required to ensure that license restrictions, in particu-
lar territorial restrictions, are not used as facilitating devices in
either the upstream or the downstream markets.8 " The Technol-
ogy Transfer Block Exemption clearly demonstrates the impor-
tance of distinguishing purely vertical agreements from agree-
ments with horizontal elements and of subjecting horizontal re-
strictions to a more careful analysis.8 4
3. Territorial Restraints
If the notion of restriction of economic freedom is replaced
by greater emphasis on market structure and an agreement's ef-
fects on the market, the analysis of territorial license restraints
should follow the same principles.8 " Territorial exclusivity in Li-
81. Interestingly, the 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines assume that license ar-
rangements typically will be vertical. 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note
74, 1 3.3. This contrasts with the analysis of license arrangements under Article 85(1),
where the Commission traditionally assumed that license arrangements include hori-
zontal elements. See, e.g., Venit, supra note 65, at 522, n.17.
82. The grant of exclusive territories by competing licensors to their licensees, for
example, may result in higher prices than would prevail in circumstances without terri-
torial restraints.
83. See, e.g., Baumol & Ordover, Antitrust. Source of Dynamic and Static Inefciencies,
in ANTrrRUST: INNOVATION AND CoMPETITIvENESs Jorde & Teece eds., 1992); 1995 In-
tellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 74, at 1 3.3.
84. See Technology Transfer Block Exemption, supra note 60, art. 5(1), OJ. L 31/2
at 10 (1996) (stating that block exemption not applicable to certain agreements be-
tween competitors); id. art. 7(4), OJ. L 31/2 at 11 (1996) (positing that best efforts
clause in license agreement between competitor may result in withdrawal of block ex-
emption).
85. See also 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines, supra note 74, at 1 4.1.2 (stating
that exclusive territories and exclusive dealing restrictions in Licensing Agreements
raise concerns similar to restriction outside licensing context, although ease of misap-
propriating intellectual property might justify otherwise anticompetitive restriction).
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censing Agreements may have negative effects on competition,
for example, by facilitating collusion. Licensors might use re-
strictions imposed on their respective licensees, for example, to
coordinate prices or competing manufacturers may use territo-
rial restrictions to divide markets.
Commentators have argued that territorial protection may
be anticompetitive, even in a purely vertical agreement. Re-
duced intra-brand competition may allow licensees, for example,
to pass on a reduction in license fees only in part to consumers.
This may discourage a licensor from lowering license fees
charged to licensees. Similar effects are possible if competing
licensors are able to observe their competitor's attempts to in-
crease output through lower license fees and react correspond-
ingly through increased output. In those circumstances, territo-
rial restraints may induce licensors to be less price aggressive.8 6
The likelihood of such anticompetitive effects obviously de-
pends again on the existence of horizontal elements in the rela-
tionship between the parties and the structure of the markets
concerned. For example, strategic behavior in connection with
vertical restraints that restrict competition among licensors is
plausible only where the number of licensors is limited. Control
over prices by either a licensee or a licensor is possible only
where the downstream markets are not competitive and market
entry is difficult. Entry might be possible by the use of compet-
ing technology or by marketing competing products that use un-
related technology. This suggests that concerns over territorial
restrictions in vertical arrangements are justified only where
markets on both levels are concentrated and barriers to entry
are significant.87
4. Article 85(1) Analysis
The above discussion and, in particular, the emphasis on
the importance of market structure suggests a two step analysis
of territorial restraints in Licensing Agreements. The first step is
to question whether the markets are non-concentrated and the
relationship between the parties is vertical. Territorial restric-
86. See e.g., OECD, supra note 79, at 55-56; Cindy Alexander & David Reiffen, Verti-
cal Contracts as Strategic Commitments: How Are They Enforced?, 4J. ECON. & MoMT. STRAT-
EGY 623 (1995) (discussing vertical restraints in general).
87. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 79, at 58.
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tions in a vertical license relationship and in non-concentrated
markets are unlikely to restrict competition and, therefore, do
not fall under Article 85 (1) of the EC Treaty. The second step, if
the market structure or the relationship between the parties
raises concerns, is to examine possible intellectual property-spe-
cific arguments to justify restraints. A license agreement might
be procompetitive, for example, because it combines comple-
mentary technologies of the parties. Protection of a licensee
against intra-brand competition might be necessary to induce in-
vestment.88
This two-step analysis will also facilitate the application of
the L. C. Nungesser KG and Eisele V Commission ("Maize Seed") fac-
tors. The first step in many cases will already lead to the conclu-
sion that a license agreement is unlikely to appreciably affect the
position of third parties. In these cases, consideration of more
complex Maize Seed justifications becomes unnecessary.
III. TRADEMARKS
In trademark and free movement cases, the "essential func-
tion" test has played a crucial role. Major changes in trademark
and freemovement case law involved a re-evaluation of the
Court's definition of the "essential function" of trademark
rights.89 The "essential function" concept, however, can be an
instrument to avoid a full analysis of intellectual property policy.
A narrow view of the function of trademarks allows decisions in
favor of free intra-Community trade in a greater number of
cases.
90
Developments in trademark law and policy suggest that
88. Greater recognition of market structure elements in the Article 85(1) analysis
also questions the strict distinction between restrictions providing for absolute territo-
rial protection and limited territorial protection through export prohibitions. If eco-
nomic considerations, such as the need to develop new technology or introduce new
technology in a new market, justify the imposition of export bans so that those restric-
tions in certain cases may altogether fall outside Article 85(1) or are at least exemptible,
considerations of the same kind arguably may justify stronger protection against paral-
lel imports in the appropriate circumstances.
89. Compare Van Zuylen Frares v. Hag AG, [1974] E.C.R. at 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R.
127 (hereinafter HAG 1], with HAG II, [1990] E.C.R. I at 3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at
5710.
90. In the Court's view, the right to prevent parallel imports would enable the
trademark holder to partition off markets where "no such restriction was necessary to
guarantee the essence of the right flowing from the trademark." Centrafarm BV, [1974]
E.C.R. at 1162-63, 11, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 503-04. The decisive question is, there-
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trademark and free movement cases should include a broader
analysis than currently found in the Court's case law. The same
argument applies to the antitrust analysis of trademark Licens-
ing Agreements. These issues have been raised in recent trade-
mark cases, including Ideal-Standard and the repackaging cases.
A. Recent Trademark Case Law
1. The Ideal-Standard Case
In Ideal-Standard,91 the Court held that after a voluntary divi-
sion of the trademark rights, Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Treaty
did not prohibit the holder of a trademark right from blocking
imports from another Member State of products with the same
trademark which an independent right holder in the Member
State of export owned.9" Ideal-Standard became the final step to-
wards the elimination of the "common origin" doctrine in trade-
mark cases.93 Ideal-Standard largely relied on the reasoning in
HAG II," and like in HAG I, the Court emphasized the function
fore, how one defines the "essence of the right flowing from the trademark" which in
subsequent judgments became the "essential function."
91. IdealStandard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 8.57; see, e.g., Guy
Tritton, Articles 30 to 36 and Intellectual Prperty: Is the Jurisprudence of the ECJ Now of an
Ideal-Standard?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 422 (1994); Ian Forrester & Anne Nielsen,
Repackaging and the Grey Market in the EC: Does Ideal-Standard Provide New Hope for Trade-
mark Owners?, Paper delivered at the Third Annual Fordham Conference on Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Law and Policy (1995) (approving developments in Ideal-
Standard). But see William Alexander, Case Comment on Ideal-Standard, 32 COMMON MAR-
KET L. REv. 327 (1995) (criticizing Court for being overprotective of intellectual prop-
erty rights).
92. The division of the "Ideal-Standard" mark occurred when the French and the
German subsidiaries of the American Standard group initially held the rights in the
"Ideal-Standard" mark in their territories and later the French subsidiary, Ideal-Stan-
dard SA, in the course of insolvency proceedings, transferred a division of its business
with the "Ideal-Standard" trademark to SGF, an unrelated company in France, which
later assigned the rights to CICh. CICh's German subsidiary, Internationale
Heiztechnik, began to sell CICh's products with the Ideal-Standard trademark in Ger-
many. Ideal-Standard GmbH, the German subsidiary of the American Standards Group
and holder of the German Ideal-Standard trademark, sued IHT for trademark infringe-
ment.
93. HAG I, [1974] E.C.R. at 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 127 (establishing "common
origin" doctrine after expropriation of trademark rights in one Member State). The
Court reversed HAG I in HAG II, but only with respect to an involuntary division of
trademark rights. See HAG II, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-3711, [1990] 3 C.M.LR. at 571. Ideal-
Standard clarified that a voluntary division trademark right did not trigger exhaustion
under Community free movement rules. Ideal-Standard, [1994] at E.C.R. 1-789, [1994] 3
C.M.L.R. at 857.
94. The Court in HAG II found that the function of the trademark to guarantee
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of trademarks as a guarantee of the source of marked products.
The Court found that consumers would not be able to identify
the origin of a product if two products of independent origin
bearing the same trademark could be marketed in the same ter-
ritory. In the Court's view, this rationale applied after govern-
ment expropriation as well as a voluntary division of trademark
rights.95
Of particular interest here is the Court's important state-
ment about the territorial nature and independence of national
trademark rights.9 6 The Court found, "trademark rights are first
of all territorial" and concluded that, therefore, the function of
the trademark also must be assessed by reference to a particular
territory.97 In the case of assignments, the Court viewed the in-
dependence and territoriality of trademark rights as justifying
the right holder's interest to block imports of products marketed
in another Member State.
In sharp contrast and arguably not fully consistent with the
Court's emphasis on territoriality, was the Court's position with
respect to Licensing Agreements. The Court reaffirmed in dic-
tum previous case law that denied the right to restrict parallel
imports of products that originated from the same source, were
produced under a license agreement, or were marketed by the
right holder's distributor. The decisive factor in the Court's view
was the right holder's ability to control production and quality of
the products. This applied even if the right holder decided to
market products of different quality under the same trademark
in different Member States. Negative effects on the trademark
in this case were the right holder's own responsibility. Free
the identity of the origin of a product would be jeopardized if the trademark holder
could not block imports of similar goods with an identical trademark that had been
marketed by an independent party. HAG I, [1990] E.C.R. at 1-3758-59, 14-16,
[1990] 3 C.M.L.R. at 608.
95. Ideal Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2848-51, It 37-48, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 908-
10.
96. Another important aspect is the applicability of Article 85(1) to trademark as-
signments. The Court emphasized that trademark assignments do not per se infringe
Article 85(1). But see Elizabeth McKnight, Trademark Assignments andEC Law, 18 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REv. 271, 276 (1996). McKnight submits that the enforcement of trade-
mark rights after assignments in the course of the sale of a business is prohibited under
Article 85(1). Her view is incompatible with the facts and language in Ideal-Standard.
97. Ideal-Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2843-44, 1-2851, 21-23,48, [1994] 3
C.M.L.R. at 905, 910 (stating that function of trademark must be assessed by reference
to specific territory).
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movement principles had to prevail over the right holder's inter-
ests.
Even though Ideal-Standard strengthened the position of
right holders in cases of assignments, the Court's emphasis on
unitary control and the trademark's guarantee of a single source
demonstrates that Ideal-Standard was actually decided on a nar-
row understanding of the function of trademark rights. The de-
cision in favor of the right holder after a division of trademark
rights was exclusively based on the trademark's guarantee of
source function.
2. Repackaged Products and Parallel Imports
In Paranova and the other recent repackaging cases, na-
tional courts in Germany and Denmark asked the Court to clar-
ify the right of trademark holders to oppose imports of pharma-
ceutical products that had been repackaged after they had been
marketed by a right holder in a Member State.98 Danish courts
also raised the question of whether the 1988 Trademark Direc-
tive ("Trademark Directive") affected the Court's interpretation
of Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Treaty in repackaging cases.9
The repackaging cases were follow-up cases on Hoffmann-La
Roche, which for the first time had considered the trademark
holder's right to oppose parallel imports of repackaged prod-
ucts. 100 In Hoffmann-La Roche, the Court held that Article 36 al-
lowed, in principle, the right to prevent parallel imports of re-
98. Paranova, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3457; Eurim-Pharm, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3603. The
issues raised before the Court were to a large extent similar in all cases. Eurim Pharm,
Paranova, and MPA Pharma are companies specializing in parallel imports of pharma-
ceutical products. They bought pharmaceutical products in low price countries such as
Spain, Portugal, France, Greece, and the United Kingdom, repackaged them in one
form or another and imported the new packages into Denmark and Germany. The
repackaging included sometimes only putting blister strips into new external packag-
ing, replacing parts of the original package such as a spray, or cutting original blister
strips to create a package with a number of tablets that was marketable in the Member
State of import. In almost all cases, the parallel importer also added information in the
language of the Member State of import.
99. First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating
to Trade Marks, No. 89/104/EEC O.J. L 40/1 (1989) [hereinafter Trademark Direc-
tive]. In the cases brought against Paranova, the Danish courts asked the Court about
the relationship between the Trademark Directive's repackaging provision in Article 7
and the Court's interpretation of Article 36 of the EC Treaty.
100. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse GmbH, Case 102/77, [1978] E.C.R. 1039, [1978] 3
C.M.L.R1 217.
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packaged products on which the original trademark had been
reaffixed. Restrictions on parallel imports were an impermissi-
ble disguised restriction on intra-Community trade, unless four
factors were met: (a) the use of the trademark right contributed
to the artificial partitioning of the markets; (b) the repackaging
adversely affected the original condition of the product; (c) the
right holder was not notified about the repackaging; and (d) the
new packaging did not include a notice about the person re-
sponsible for the repackaging.'' The Court viewed this result as
"unavoidable" in the interests of freedom of trade, although this
was more a statement than an explanation. 10 2
Hoffmann-La Roche created considerable uncertainty. It was
unclear, for example, what evidence was necessary to establish
the right holder's "artificial market partitioning." Language in
Hoffmann La Roche indicated that the marketing system adopted
by the right holder was relevant to answer this question.103 It was
also an open question as to which side had to produce evidence
of adverse effects when the original condition of a product was
sufficiently "adversely affected" to make import restrictions law-
ful. 104
The adoption of the first Trademark Directive' 0 5 raised ad-
ditional questions. Articles 7(1) and 7(2) of the Trademark Di-
rective include a reference to the Court's repackaging case
law.' 0 6 Article 7(2), in particular, provides that exhaustion does
not apply after the first marketing of a product in the common
market if "there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to
oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where
the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they
have been put on the market."1 0 7 It was unclear whether this
101. Id. at 1064-66, 1 10-14, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 242-43.
102. Id. at 1065, 1 11, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 242.
103. The Court stated that restrictions on parallel imports were impermissible if
"the use of the trade-mark right by the proprietor, having regard to the marketing sys-
tem which he has adopted, will contribute to the artificial partitioning of the markets
between Member States." Id. at 1064-65, 1 10, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 242.
104. National courts applied different standards after Hoffmann-La Roche. German
courts in general provided trademark holders broad protection. See, e.g., In re Kerlone
Trade Mark, Case 3 U 217/90, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 190 (Apr. 25, 1991) (Ct. App.
Hamburg).
105. Trademark Directive, supra note 99, O.J. L 40/1 (1989).
106. Id. art. 7(1), O.J. L 40/1, at 5 (1989). Article 7(1) incorporates the principle
of Community-wide exhaustion. Id.
107. Id. art. 7(2), OJ. L 40/1, at 5 (1989). The Community Trademark Regula-
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provision went beyond the Hoffmann-La Roche criteria. Given the
Court's oft-repeated view that trademark rights are no more
than a guarantee to consumers of the source of products, it is
perhaps not surprising that the Court in Paranova granted paral-
lel traders a broad right to import repackaged products. The
trademark holder's interests are allowed to prevail only if repack-
aging was capable of directly or indirectly" 8 affecting the prod-
ucts' original condition. 109
The interference with the product at a later marketing stage
is, therefore, in the Court's view the decisive factor in deciding
whether Community law allowed parallel trade in repackaged
products. An adverse effect on the repackaged products exists
only if the condition of the product inside the packaging was
affected. The mere possibility that repackaging had a negative
impact on the products could not justify restrictions on parallel
imports of repackaged products. Indirect effects, such as the
lack of adequate information on the new packaging, however,
can be sufficiently strong to allow a court to find in favor of the
right holder."'
The parallel importer has to meet certain additional re-
quirements before parallel imports are permissible. Examples
include providing information about the repackaging and notifi-
cation of the right holder.1 Perhaps most importantly, and to
tion incorporates the same provision in Article 13(2). Council Regulation No. 40/94
on the Community Trade Mark, art. 13(2), O.J. L 11/1, at 6 (1994) [hereinafter Com-
munity Trademark Regulation].
108. The original condition could be "indirectly" affected, for example, if the re-
packaged product omitted important user instructions or an extra article was added by
the importer which did not comply with the method intended by the manufacturer.
109. Paranova, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 1215-16, 58-66. In a first step, the Court
had already "clarified" that the "artificial market partitioning" element in Hoffmann-La
Roche was largely irrelevant to decide whether parallel imports of repackaged products
were allowed. The Court found that artificial partitioning of markets existed as soon as
the right holder attempted to restrict imports of repackaged products that had been
sold in another form of packaging in the Member State of export, regardless of the
reasons for the use of different packaging, including the right holder's motives or in-
tent. See id. at 1214-15, 1 52-57. The only instance where the Court would allow the
right holder to oppose the import of repackaged products was where the size of the
original package was already marketable in the Member State of import, and adding
information in the language of the Member State of import was enough to make the
products marketable. See id. at 1214-15, 55.
110. Id. at 1215, 58; MPA Pharma [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3686, 130.
111. Paranova, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 1216-17, 11 67-74; see also Hoffmann-La Roche
[1978] E.C.R. at 1165, 1 12, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. at 242.
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some extent inconsistent with prior parts of the judgment, the
Court added in the "other requirement" category explaining
that the right holder could prevent the marketing with new
packaging that adversely affected the trademark's reputation. 112
In Paranova, the Court, moreover, found that no contradic-
tion existed between the Trademark Directive's provisions and
the Court's own interpretation of Articles 30 and 36 of the EC
Treaty. In other words, the Court viewed the "legitimate reasons
for the proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the
products" in Article 7(2) of the Trademark Directive as coincid-
ing with those instances where the Court's free movement case
law permitted a right holder to block parallel imports and did
not go any further. 1 3
3. The Rules After Ideal-Standard and the repackaging cases
The Court, in the repackaging cases and in Ideal-Standard,
continued to use a narrow definition of the function of trade-
marks. The definition set forth in these cases recognizes only
the risk of consumer confusion about the origin of products.
This approach fails to adequately address other trademark policy
concerns such as interference with local distribution systems and
consumer confusion with regard to the quality of products.
Paranova confirmed the Court's view that differences be-
tween Member State market regulations also have no influence
on the Court's analysis of trademark-related free movement of
goods rules.114 In the Court's view, Community-wide harmoniza-
tion must remedy distortions that Member State pricing rules
create. Another Member State introducing measures which are
incompatible with the rules on the free movement of goods
could not cause the distortion.' 15 The Court in Ideal-Standard
mentioned in dictum that quality differences between products
bearing the same mark are irrelevant as long as products are
112. Paranova, [1997] 1 C.M.L.RL at 1216-17, 67; Eurim-Pharm, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 1237 158; MPA Pharma, [1996] E.C.R. at 3688, 1 39. The source guarantee function
cannot explain this additional right of the trademark holder. Significantly, the Court
in this section of the judgment did not refer to the "essential function" doctrine.
113. See also Opinion of the Advocate GeneralJacobs, Paranova, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 1190-92, 90-99.
114. Paranova, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 1212-13, 46.
115. There is a circularity in the Court's statement. See supra note 43 and accom-
panyig text (discussing harmonization of Member State measures that restrict parallel
imports).
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manufactured under common control. According to the Court,
a producer or an entire group had to bear responsibility if qual-
ity differences resulted in consumer confusion.' 16
The use of different trademarks also may not be a viable
strategy to protect a local distribution system. The trademark
holder's right to oppose parallel imports of repackaged and re-
labelled products goes further than in the case of simple repack-
aging. Parallel imports were found permissible only if the right
holder's subjective intent to artificially separate markets had
been established." 7 There is now great uncertainty, however, as
to what evidence is necessary to establish the intent to artificially
partition markets after the Court in Paranova rendered the "arti-
ficial partitioning" element irrelevant in the repackaging
cases. 
118
B. Reconsidering the Functions of Trademarks
1. General Perspectives
The Court's position on trademark rights and free move-
116. Ideal-Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2848, 38, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 908. The
Court had reached the same result in Dansk Supermarked, A/S v. A/S Imerco, SA, Case
58/80, [19811 E.C.R. 181, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 590 (holding that trademark rights cannot
be enforced against parallel imports of dinnerware from another Member States even
though imported products were of secondary quality).
117. Centrafarm BV, [1978] E.C.R. at 1841-42, 21-23, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. at 343.
It is not entirely clear why the Court in Centrafarm BV adopted more lenient criteria.
The result is not consistent with a strict application of the guarantee of origin function.
As long as the trademark holder owns the rights in both the old and the newly affixed
trademark, changing the trademarks cannot confuse consumers about the origin of
products. It is conceivable that the Court upheld the right holder's broader rights to
block parallel imports in light of the economic circumstances that will usually be be-
hind the use of different trademarks. The trademark holder will often find it desirable
to market products with similar qualities under different trademarks to specifically tar-
get different groups of customers. Prices will frequently be different, depending on
differences in the demand elasticity of each consumer group. This strategy will benefit
consumers because it allows the producer to better match consumer needs. Allowing
for an unrestricted right of parallel imports in this case would interfere with the right
holder's legitimate market strategy and also act against the public interest because it
reduces the choice for consumers. See, e.g., C.W.F. Baden Fuller, Economic Issues Relating
to Property Rights in Trademarks: Export Bans, Differential Pricing Restrictions on Resale and
Repackaging, 6 EUR. L. REv. 162, 178 (1981). Whether the Court's ruling in Centrapharm
BV is indeed based on this form of economic analysis remains somehow doubtful. If it
is, one wonders why the Court categorically rejects similar considerations in the case of
parallel imports of repackaged products with identical trademarks.
118. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing Court's rationale in
Paranova).
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ment rules appears persuasive as long as the definition of the
function of trademark is confined solely to the protection of
consumers against confusion.119 Views on the role of trade-
marks, however, have expanded. Correspondingly, opinions
about the functions of trademarks have changed.
In legal and economic literature, commentators today de-
scribe trademarks not only as an exclusive right to indicate the
origin of products towards consumers, but also as property-like
rights that may represent a significant economic value for the
right holder. Trademark laws today, in one form or another,
reflect these additional functions. Trademarks, for example, are
designed to encourage and protect the right holder's investment
in the goodwill of a trademark. Trademark rights protect in cer-
tain circumstances the economic value that the right holder cre-
ated. In certain circumstances, the trademark holder has the
right to prevent the use of a similar sign by a third party if such
use reduces the trademark's goodwill, even if the sign does not
cause confusion about the origin of a product.
Interestingly, the Court in the repackaging cases apparently
recognized that trademark rights protect goodwill in the trade-
mark, independent of the source guarantee. It held that the
parallel importer's use of packaging materials that damaged the
trademark's reputation permitted the trademark holder to op-
pose parallel imports of the repackaged products. It is signifi-
cant, however, that the Court did not consider that the trade-
mark holder's right would require an expansion of the Court's
own "essential function" doctrine.120
Trademarks are also viewed as guarantees of quality. Con-
sumers associate with a trademark a consistent quality of prod-
ucts, not necessarily the origin of a product. In this case, trade-
marks are used to make the product more attractive, not to iden-
tify the manufacturer of the product.1 21 Commentators have
emphasized that the quality guarantee function is important also
from the right holder's perspective and not only from that of
119. See also Tritton, supra note 91, at 426 (arguing that Court in Ideal-Standard
recognized solely consumer interest in source of products).
120. Paranova, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 1217-18, 1 75-76. The Court has, moreover,
not yet been willing to consider that establishing local goodwill might require legal
protection against imports from other territories.
121. See, e.g., N. Wilkof, Same Old Tricks or Something New? A View of Trade Mark
Licensing and Quality Control, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 261, 268 (1996).
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consumer interest. Trademarks enable the right holder to de-
fine and maintain a specific quality of the trademarked prod-
ucts. 12 2 The corresponding legal right enables the trademark
holder to sue for trademark infringement if a licensee fails to
meet the quality standards as defined in the license agree-
ment.12
3
2. European Community Trademark Legislation
EC law recognizes that the guarantee of origin is only one of
several functions of trademarks. 124 Several provisions in the
Trademark Directive and the Community Trademark Regula-
tion cannot be explained by the guarantee of source function
alone and, therefore, reflect a broader understanding of trade-
mark rights. 125
Article 5(1) (b) of the Trademark Directive provides, for in-
stance, for a trademark holder's right to prevent the use of signs
that are similar to the trademark if a likelihood of association
between the trademark and the sign exists.' 26 In this case, the
122. See Lehmann & Sch6nfeld, Die neue europdiische Marke: Positive Handlungsrechte
im Dienst der Informations'konomie, 96 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT
481, 487 (1994).
123. Commentators have identified several functions of a trademark in addition to
the guarantee of origin and the guarantee of the quality of a product. One is the so-
called advertising function which allows the right holder to use marks to influence con-
sumers' purchasing decisions. The advertising function acknowledges the goodwill that
a trademark can attract independently of the goodwill of the product. See, e.g., J. M_,
CARTHY, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 116, § 3.05 (4th ed. 1996); A. Sanders &
S. Maniatis, A Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Based on Origin and Quality, 15 EUR. IN-
TELL. PROP. REV. 406 (1993). Today, trademarks are also viewed as the right holder's
means of communication between the right holder and the consumer. Their function
is to transfer to the consumer a certain message about the quality of a product and a
certain image.
124. See Trademark Directive, supra note 99, pmbl., recital 10, O.J. L 40/1, at 1-2
(1989) (stating that protection of trademarks in particular to guarantee function of
trademark as indication of origin). Most elements of the Trademark Directive exist also
in the Community Trademark Regulation. Because this Article is concerned primarily
with the relationship between Community law and Member State trademark law, the
discussion will refer to the relevant provisions in the Trademark Directive that Member
States had to implement by December 31, 1993.
125. See, e.g., Charles Gielen, Harmonisation of Trade Mark Law in Europe: The First
Trade Mark Harmonisation Directive of the European Council, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
262, 264 (1992) (discussing trademark policies reflected in Trademark Directive).
126. Id. Article 5(1) (b) of the Trademark Directive provides for the trademark
holder's right to oppose the use of:
[A]ny sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark
and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the tarde
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Trademark Directive requires no association about the origin of
the products. No-origin confusion is sufficient to establish the
trademark holder's infringement claim." 7 Along the same lines,
trademarks enjoying a reputation in a Member State may be pro-
tected against signs that take unfair advantage of the trademark's
reputation or might dilute the trademark's reputation. Anti-di-
lution protection does not require that consumers could be mis-
led about the origin of products. Both provisions demonstrate
that trademark rights also protect the economic value of a mark
against interference by third parties. Trademarks are from that
perspective property-like rights, not just indications of origin.
Article 8 of the Trademark Directive is a particularly inter-
esting provision.1 21 It defines the trademark holder's ability to
grant trademark licenses and the holder's rights vis-d-vis its licen-
sees. Article 8(2) permits the trademark holder, for example, to
sue for trademark infringement if the licensee fails to meet the
quality standards set forth in the license agreement. The right
holder may also grant licenses for the whole or part of a Member
State and bring a trademark infringement action against a licen-
see who affixes the licensed mark on products outside the li-
censed territory. Article 8(2) has important consequences for
the understanding of trademark rights. Article 8(2) shows that
the quality function of trademarks enjoys legal protection. 12 9 It
also demonstrates that trademarks can be used to control to
some extent distribution channels of trademarked products. It
is at the same time a strong indication that the Trademark Direc-
mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the
public, which includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the
trade mark.
Trademark Directive, supra note 99, art. 5(1) (b), O.J. L 40/1, at 4 (1989).
127. See, e.g., Gielen, supra note 125; but see Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Restau-
rants PLC, [1995] F.S.R. 713 (Ch. 1995) (holding as insufficient evidence that associa-
tion language in Article 5 of the Trademark Directive actually referred to concept of
no-origin association as developed under Benelux trademark law). British trademark
law, therefore, recognizes trademark infringement only when similarity between sign
and trademark creates confusion about origin of products.
128. Article 8(2) of the Trademark Directive provides:
The proprietor of a trade mark may invoke the rights conferred by that trade
mark against a licensee who contravenes any provision in his licensing con-
tract with regard to ... the territory in which the trade mark may be affixed, or
the quality of the goods manufactured or of the services provided by the licen-
see.
Trademark Directive, supra note 99, art. 8(2), OJ. L 40/1, at 5 (1989).
129. Lehmann & Sch6nfeld, supra note 122, at 487.
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tive's trademark protection includes the protection of local
goodwill in separate territories.130
C. Reconsidering Free Movement Rules
The conflict-free relationship between the Court's case law
and the Trademark Directive 31 is, therefore, perhaps more per-
ceived than real. One example of possible differences is similar
trademarks that independent parties hold in different Member
States.13 2 Along the same lines, a possible dilution of a well-
known trademark by the use of a similar sign on an unrelated
product would not be protected if only the source guarantee
function of a trademark was considered relevant. Such usage,
however, does enjoy protection under the Trademark Directive.
These differences between the Trademark Directive's con-
cepts and the Court's position do not automatically strengthen
the trademark holder's right to block parallel imports. One may
argue that the Trademark Directive's expanded scope of protec-
tion improved the trademark holder's right only vis-d-vis similar
signs independent parties used.133 It does not, however, enable
right holders to divide territories.3 4
130. The guarantee of origin function alone could notjustify a trademark infringe-
ment action as long as a licensee puts products with a licensed trademark on the mar-
ket.
131. See Paranova, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3457; MPA Pharma, [1996] E.C.R. at 1-3603; see
a/so Opinion of the Advocate GeneralJacobs, Paranova, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 1178. The
Court, therefore, appeared overly optimistic when it stated that because both Article 36
of the Treaty and Article 7(2) of the Trademark Directive pursued the same goal of
balancing the trademark right holder's interests and the E.C. Community's free move-
ment interest, they pursue the same result. This view is correct only if both provisions
balance free movement and right holders interests in the same way. There are indica-
tions, however, that the Trademark Directive puts greater emphasis on the trademark
holder's interests than the Court does.
132. This issue was raised, for example, in Deutsche Renault AG v. Audi AG, Case
C-317/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6227. If the guarantee of origin is the only legally recognized
function of trademarks, the scope of protection against imports from other Member
States of products bearing confusingly similar signs is narrower. The Court might find
that EC law allows imports of trademarked products into the territory of the other right
holder. Under the Trademark Directive's concept, however, protection would be avail-
able as soon as the similarity between two marks raises the possibility of an association.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing whether Trademark Directive
protects trademark holder against use of similar signs that cause association with regis-
tered trademark, even if there is no confusion about source of products).
133. Ideal-Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2851, 1 48, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 910.
134. See Ulrich Loewenheim, Nationale und Internationale Erschipfung von Schut-
zrechten im Wandel der Zeit, 45 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT IN-
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It is, nevertheless, apparent from the above discussion of the
functions of trademarks that the analysis of parallel imports and
trademark rights within the European Community should in-
volve more considerations than the Court's indication of origin
versus free trade discussion.135 There is support for this position
in the Trademark Directive. Article 7(2) provides that changes
of the quality of products after they have been put on the market
are only one of several reasons why a trademark holder may op-
pose parallel imports. There should, therefore, be room to con-
sider circumstances that go beyond what the Court currently ac-
cepts as legitimate reasons to block parallel imports.13 6
1. Trademarks Functions and Territorial Aspects of
Trademark Rights
A significant first step in the direction of stronger protec-
tion of trademark rights is the Court's recognition in Ideal-Stan-
dard that national trademark rights are independent and fulfill
their functions with respect to a certain territory. The Court
used this concept to explain why products with identical trade-
marks belonging to two different and independent right holders
cannot be marketed within the same territory without compro-
mising the trademark source guarantee.3 7 The Court and Com-
munity trademark legislation have, therefore, apparently ac-
cepted that territorial protection is necessary in certain cases to
enable a trademark holder to use trademarks effectively.
Even though the Court in Ideal-Standard rejected in dictum
the idea that differences in product quality between Member
State markets may entitle a trademark holder to restrict parallel
imports,1 38 there is a strong argument that this should not be the
final answer. Like the Court in Ideal-Standard with respect to the
trademark's source guarantee function, one may argue that
TERNATIONALER TElL 307 (1996) (presenting similar consideration concerning possible
effects of Community trademark legislation on right to control parallel imports,
although only with respect to third country imports). A similar argument is that the
Trademark Directive affects the trademark holder's position only in relation to licen-
sees, but does not extend its protection to third party parallel imports.
135. See, e.g., Paranova, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 1211-12, 1 40.
136. Trademark Directive, supra note 99, art. 13(3), Oj. L 40/1, at 6 (1989).
137. Ideal-Standard, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-2851, 1 48, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 910.
138. Id. at 1-2849, 38, [1994] C.M.L.R. at 908; see also Tritton, supra note 91, at
426-27 (criticizing Court for making statements as obiter dicta with possible wide-rang-
ing consequences).
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trademarks protect the holder's decision to market products
with a specific quality in a certain territory so that imports of
products with a different quality from another local market com-
promise the quality guarantee function of trademarks. Trade-
marks protect consumers not only against confusion about the
origin of products, but also against confusion about the quality
of products. From the consumer perspective, confusion about
the quality of a product is actually far more important than con-
fusion about the product's origin."3 9 Unrestricted parallel im-
ports may, therefore, conflict with the quality guarantee function
of trademarks because a right holder can no longer decide
under what quality standards the trademarked product is put in
specific markets. Consumer confusion might, therefore, inter-
fere with the trademark holder's marketing strategy, at least
where the differences are significant."4 A similar idea exists in
Community trademark legislation which provides for the protec-
tion of local goodwill. 41 At least one commentator has noted
after Ideal-Standard that this issue requires further, more careful
consideration. 42
A second example might be cases where the trademark's
goodwill must be established, in particular, through local invest-
ment, for example, through advertising, other promotional ac-
tivities, and incentives for local distributors. If the creation of
goodwill depends largely on local efforts and investment, im-
ports will undermine the willingness to invest if similar invest-
ments are not required or not possible in the country of ex-
port.143 This argument also applies to the European Community
in those cases where market conditions continue to show signifi-
cant differences. The recent OECD franchising study supports
the argument that restraints on intra-brand competition may be
139. See, e.g., Tritton, supra note 91, at 426 (finding it illogical to only consider
confusion as to origin and ignore confusion as to quality).
140. See, e.g., THOMAS SCHONFELD, DIE GEMEINSCHAFrSMARKE ALS SELBSTANDIGER
VERMOGENSGEGENSTAND EINES UNTERNEHMENS 193-96 (1994) (arguing restrictions on
parallel imports should be permissible, at least where quality differences are conse-
quence of government intervention).
141. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing association language in
Article 5 of Trademark Directive relating to no-origin associations).
142. Tritton, supra note 91, at 428.
143. See, e.g., RobertJ. Staaf, The Law and Economics of the International Grey Market:
Quality Assurance, Free-Riding and Passing Off, 4 INTEL. PROP. J. 191, 214-17 (1989) (not-
ing that free-riding exists when costs of promotional activities are different in different
territories).
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desirable in these cases."'
Repackaging cases will in certain circumstances fit into this
category. The Court in Paranova rejected the argument that dif-
ferent market conditions and price levels resulting from differ-
ent forms of Member State intervention in their national health
care markets may ever justify restrictions on parallel imports to
protect trademark holder interests. 4 5 In the Court's view, mar-
ket distortions could not be remedied by another type of unlaw-
ful Member State measure that restricts intra-Community trade.
The main focus in this case, however, should be the possible
adverse effects of grey market products on trademarks in the ter-
ritory of the Member State of import, not market distortions that
result from Member State market regulation. Parallel trade ex-
ports the market regulation and artificially low prices of one
Member State into other Member States. 146  Parallel imports
may, in this situation, limit the trademark holder's ability to
recoup the investments in the establishment of local goodwill in
the Member State of import where prices are not subject to regu-
lation. This might reduce the incentive for further investments
in marketing efforts. In this situation, import restrictions pro-
tect legitimate trademark interests in one Member State that are
144. See, e.g., FRANCHISING AGREEMENTS, supra note 79, at 41-42. Concerns about
local trademark rights justify greater protection where a distributor invests in the image
of products to create a reputation, in particular, if consumers believe that their experi-
ence with products of one distributor applies to products from other distributors. Par-
allel imports may prevent distributors from appropriating the benefits of services they
supply. Without restraints on intra-brand competition, the level of services would be
too low. In at least one case, the Commission was reportedly willing to consider these
concerns under competition rules when the trademark holder withdrew the products
from the low price market to prevent parallel imports.
145. Paranova, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 1212-13, 46; ,entrafarm BV, [1974] E.C.R. at
1147, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 480 (holding price differences resulting from governmental
intervention in national health care markets do not justify restrictions on parallel im-
ports); see also supra note 43 and accompanying text (criticizing Court's statements
about impermissible Member State restrictions of parallel trade as circular). Along the
same lines, Advocate General Jacobs dismissed the pharmaceutical companies' argu-
ment that differences in the market conditions resulting from Member State price regu-
lation justified the use of trademark rights to restrict intra-Community trade. See Opin-
ion of Advocate General Jacobs, Paranova, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. at 1185-86, 1 76, 79.
Interestingly, Advocate GeneralJacobs considered that a different rule might be appro-
priate in the case of patent rights. Id. at 1185, 1 76.
146. Price control measures in the Member State of export presumably also sup-
press efforts to establish local goodwill.
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not already protected in the Member State of export.14
2. Exceptions Under Article 36 of the EC Treaty
The above analysis suggests that well-defined trademark pol-
icy considerations may justify restrictions on intra-brand compe-
tition through parallel imports to a greater extent than under
the Court's current "essential function" test. A modification of
the current rules may, for example, expand current exceptions
from free movement rules under Article 36 of the EC Treaty to
allow greater restrictions on parallel imports in certain cases.
Such exceptions could apply where the quality of products mar-
keted in various Member States with the same trademark goods
is significantly different, particularly if the differences are the re-
sult of government regulation. 4 ' It would not be impossible to
address these concerns under Article 36 and determine circum-
stances in which the increased protection of trademarks justifies
trade restrictions. In other cases, the Court has engaged in com-
plex balancing of conflicting interests and also required national
courts to apply the same balancing of interests. The same rea-
sonableness and proportionality standards could be used when
Article 36 is applied to trademark and parallel import cases.
To a certain extent, the Court in Paranova has already intro-
duced such a reasonableness test by holding that a trademark
holder could oppose parallel imports of repackaged products
where the inappropriate presentation of the repackaged product
might harm the right holder's interests. Determining at what
point the packaging is sufficiently inappropriate to justify import
restrictions apparently requires national courts to engage in a
fact-specific inquiry and a difficult balancing of opposing inter-
ests. Requiring a national court to determine whether products
of different quality are marketed in different Member States
without unlawful market separation intention and that parallel
imports would interfere with the local goodwill of trademark
rights cannot be more difficult than the Court's "inappropriate
presentation" standards.
It would facilitate the adoption of more flexible rules if the
Court abandoned the mechanical "essential function" and "sub-
147. But see id., at 1185-86, 1 79 (rejecting argument that producers' investment in
establishment of local goodwill justifies their right to block parallel imports).
148. See, e.g., SCHONFELD, supra note 140.
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ject matter" tests and applied the general Article 36 analysis in
intellectual property cases.
D. Trademark Licensing Agreements
Changes in trademark policy also affect the antitrust analysis
of trademark Licensing Agreements. The best starting point to
analyze this issue is the Ideal-Standard holding that restrictions
resulting from agreements compatible with Community law do
not automatically infringe Article 85(1). Article 85(1) applies
only if additional evidence of an anticompetitive purpose ex-
* tS149is s. 
This principle should generally apply to all restrictions in
Licensing Agreements that Community law accepts as legitimate.
uses of trademark rights. Such restrictions should be found to
fall under Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty only if additional evi-
dence demonstrates the existence of an anticompetitive purpose
in the license agreement. Article 8(2) of the Trademark Direc-
tive, 150 for example, expressly provides for the enforcement of
trademark rights if a licensee violates territorial restrictions im-
posed in the license agreement and affixes the trademark
outside the licensed territory. Article 8(2), at least, covers grants
of exclusive trademark licenses.
The grant of an exclusive trademark license may, therefore,
be found to infringe Article 85(1) only after an analysis of all
circumstances, including the parties' intentions and evidence of
a sham agreement. In principle, it is not remarkable that a find-
ing of an infringement of Article 85(1) requires a vigorous and
complete analysis of economic and other circumstances.15 ' Such
an approach certainly means, however, a significant change in
the Commission practice which tends to mechanically apply Arti-
cle 85(1) to the grant of exclusive licenses and reserves a fuller
analysis for Article 85(3) .152
149. The Court in Ideal-Standard held that restrictions resulting from trademark
assignments do not automatically infringe Article 85(1). Ideal-Standard, [1994] E.C.R.
at 1-2793, 1 59, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. at 912.
150. See also Community Trademark Regulation, supra note 107, art. 22(2), OJ. L
11/1, at 8 (1994).
151. See, e.g., Hawk, supra note 71, at 987.
152. See Commission Decision No. 78/253 EEC, OJ. L 70/69 (1978), [1978] 2
C.M.L.R. 397 (Campari); OJ. L 100/32 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 391 (Moosehead/
Whitbread).
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Similar ideas apply to territorial restrictions beyond exclu-
sivity-like export restrictions, especially because of the recogni-
tion that trademarks fulfill their functions with respect to a cer-
tain territory and that the protection of goodwill is among the
"essential" functions of trademarks.1
-
3 These concepts should be
included in the evaluation of vertical territorial restraints in
trademark Licensing Agreements. If a licensor may demonstrate
that certain restrictions are necessary to establish a trademark's
local goodwill, Article 85 (1) should not apply unless there is evi-
dence of an anticompetitive purpose such as market allocation
among licensees.
Commentators have long argued in favor of greater flexibil-
ity in the application of Article 85(1) to vertical restraints." Re-
cently, a Commission official has persuasively argued that the ex-
amination of vertical restraints under EC competition law should
place greater emphasis on the analysis of market circum-
stances. 155 The Courts appear to have moved in that direction,
although that development has not been entirely consistent. 15
6
This section demonstrates that this approach is justified for
an analysis of trademark licensing Agreements, for example, in
connection with distributorship or production franchise ar-
rangements. In particular, trademark policy considerations sup-
port a more lenient treatment of vertical territorial restraints in
addition to the general market structure and efficiency consider-
ations. These ideas again justify a two-step analysis in trademark
Licensing Agreements, along the lines of the analysis suggested
above for patent Licensing Agreements. 57 If markets are uncon-
centrated, restrictions in trademark licensing Agreements
should be permissible even if they impose territorial restraints
on licensees and limit competition among licensees. Article
85(1), therefore, does not apply. Concentrated markets require
153. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing Court's statement in
Ideal-Standard that trademarks can fulfill their function only with respect to certain terri-
tory).
154. See, e.g., John S. Chard, The Economics of Exclusive Distributorship Arrangements
with Special Reference to E.E.C. Competition Policy, 25 ANrrrRusT BuLL. 405, 429 (1980);
Hawk, supra note 71; Veltrop, supra note 73.
155. Deacon, supra note 69, at 316, 319-21.
156. Compare Delimitis, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-935, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 210, and
Langnese-Ito GmbH, [1995] E.C.R. at 11-1533, with Bundeskartellamt, [1995] E.C.R. at I-
3477.
157. See also FaNCHISING AGREEMENTS, supra note 79, at 57-60.
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a more careful evaluation of anticompetitive risks. This evalua-
tion must then incorporate trademark policy-specific considera-
tions such as the need to establish local goodwill in the trade-
mark or to protect quality expectations associated with the trade-
mark.1
5 8
158. This second step of the analysis would be similar to the Court's Article 85(1)
test in Ideal-Standard. The Court assumed that EC antitrust law is capable of distinguish-
ing cases where restrictions on intra-Community trade resulting from an assignment of
trademark rights were justified to protect right holder interests from cases where im-
port restrictions were part of an unlawful agreement. The Court held that an analysis
of the context of an agreement, the parties' intention, and the commitments underly-
ing the agreement was required before finding an infringement of Article 85(1).
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